In this article Barkly’s view on philosophy of science is studied corresponding semantics, epistemologic and ontologic points of view.Barkly’s approach to the philosophy of science depends on positivism and his notion to language and word usage in scientific theories. The ontology of theoric and related terms consider real entity in this view.Epistemology doesn’t regard scientific theories as the creator of new science, but takes it as a device in order to analyze mathematical data. Semantics fails to accept the truthfulness and falsehood these theories.

The effects of philosophical concepts can be seen in various fields of science. One of the areas of influence of philosophy on economics has been around methodological concepts and epistemology. It seems that prominent economists of the 20th century were not without this influence. One of the philosophical concepts affecting Friedman's methodology is the concept of INSTRUMENTALISM. This concept is one of the challenging and important topics that has been considered in Friedman's economics article. The use of this word and concept in the case of Friedman's article has been a controversial issue and has led to the emergence of challenging discussions in this regard. In this article, the correctness of attributing this word to Friedman's methodology has been discussed. The findings of the research show that there were elements of INSTRUMENTALISM in Friedman's article and the presence of these elements of INSTRUMENTALISM in Friedman's article has caused many to use this word about Friedman's methodology. Despite the existence of some commonalities, Friedman's INSTRUMENTALISM has significant differences from conventional philosophical INSTRUMENTALISM. Philosophical INSTRUMENTALISM means a philosophical approach that has been proposed against the current of realism, but Friedman's INSTRUMENTALISM does not fundamentally oppose realism and is mostly stopped in the methodological field. If INSTRUMENTALISM means Friedman's use of theories as a tool to achieve the goal of prediction, then Friedman can be described as an instrumentalist; but if we use this word in its philosophical meaning, Friedman has a significant distance from this type of INSTRUMENTALISM. Paying attention to this subtle distinction can prevent many misunderstandings regarding Friedman's methodology.

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The principle is personal responsibility,No one bears the burden of another's sins. However, in all the civilized legal systems of the world, including America and Iran, in some cases, this principle is deviated from. Whenever someone helps someone else in committing the material element of the crime or causes the crime to occur, even though the specific person or the facilitator does not have a role in committing the material element of the crime, due to the causation of the crime, he is liable to punishment. In the instrumentalist American legal system, the deputy is punished as the mastermind of the crime. Although this is justifiable from the point of view of deterrence, it is against the standards of criminal justice. In Iran's legal system, based on adherence to the principles of criminal justice, the punishment of the deputy is lower than the punishment of the supervisor, which is weak in terms of deterrence, at least in some cases, but seems more consistent with the principles of criminal justice. Based on this difference, it seems that in the two systems, the concept, nature, territory, conditions, and effects of aiding and abetting crime in American and Iranian laws have fundamental differences. The question of the current research is how the analysis of the criminal deputy is done based on the principles of criminal law, especially INSTRUMENTALISM. In this article, while answering this problem in an analytical-descriptive way, it has been suggested that by applying some criteria, it would distance itself from the excesses in America and Iran, so that in addition to the realization of criminal justice, other ideals and goals such as deterrence be realized

Criticizing and discussing media technology theories which are predominant in Para-Communicational literature, would help media scholars to better understand the nature of modern media. Although INSTRUMENTALISM is an outdated approach in epistemological studies of media, it is still applied in communication theories. Determinism in different forms such as technological autonomy, technological necessity, technical evolutionism, and media technologies as the only cause of all social changes has simply remained as a claim. However, there are some determinists who reject the ultimate importance and influence of media technologies and do consider some roles for media spaces, too. Social structuralism as the latest post-determinism theory, tries to shed light on ambiguities and exaggerations which were presented by INSTRUMENTALISM and determinism supporters, during the last century, moreover, it confirms the influence of technology on society and asserts that media technologies have emerged from a social historical context. This paper criticizes two main paradigms in communication studies and emphasizes on social structuralism as an alternative theory.

Milton Friedman’s seminal article, “Methodology of Positive Economics”, is one of the most important and contentious works ever been discussed within the realm of economic methodology. In this article, on the basis of an instrumentalist approach to the nature of theorizing, Friedman declares the tenets of positive economics, and in this vein, he professes his disputable doctrine about “unrealistic assumptions” as the core of his view. In this article, we try to discuss over some logical and theoretical defects in Friedman’s article which essentially weakens his supportive arguments about his views (internal critique); furthermore, in the light of Lakatos’ epistemological framework, we take into consideration the epistemological status of Friedman’s predectivist INSTRUMENTALISM (external critique) and we reach this conclusion that his approach is degenerating in Lakatosian term.

The purpose of writing this article is to answer the important question of whether technology is a neutral tool or has a value and moral direction and burden. Method: The method of writing the article is documentary analysis. In response, while providing an autonomous definition of technology and orientation, by citing four reasons for the neutrality of technology (instrumentalists) and criticizing their arguments (such as Pete, Motahari, Rahimpour) the arguments of proponents of technology orientation with six different tendencies have been discussed ( Eg Heidegger, Feinberg, Nasr, Postman, Golshani, Ihde, Wendpool, Cruz, Soroush, etc). Then he considers the arguments of people such as essentialists and determinists as coercive and extreme, and finally, by accepting the words of the proponents of the influence of a priori sciences and culture on technology and conditionally accepting the theory of "technology mediation" and "application plan" of technology, to a moderate position. Results and Conclusion: The author rejects both the extremism of the essentialists and the deviance of the instrumentalists and takes a corrective position between the two.

This paper is going to examine critically the philosophical foundations of John Dewey's ethical views. Dewey argues that ethical inquiry is of a kind of empirical inquiries. Value judgments are some instruments for enabling the satisfactory redirection of conduct when habit no longer suffices to direct it. As tools, they can be evaluated instrumentally, in terms of their success in guiding conduct. We test our value judgments by putting them into practice and seeing whether the results are satisfactory whether they solve the problems they were designed to solve. This pragmatic approach requires that we locate the conditions of warrant for our value judgments in human conduct itself, not in any a priori fixed reference point outside of conduct, such as in God's commands, Platonic Forms or pure reason. The main problem of moral philosophy of John Dewey is relativism.

Contemporary English physicist, Stephen Hawking, by authoring The Big Plan and introducing the M-theory, brought the long-running conflict between science and religion to a new level. Despite Hawking's claim of the ‘death of philosophy’, he has used some philosophical principles in his M-theory. This paper, using the descriptive-analytical method, seeks to evaluate these principles. The most important philosophical foundations on which M-theory is based are: (1) Scientism, as the most fundamental basis of M-theory; (2) INSTRUMENTALISM, ccording to which laws and theories are merely some instruments for predicting phenomena, lacking any physical reality; (3) Denial of causality, which has been inferred from the ‘uncertainty principle’ and the ‘principle of accident.’ After explaining these foundations, some significant objections have been directed to them, the most important of which are: scientism neglects the limitations of the empirical-experimental method and excludes other epistemological sources; INSTRUMENTALISM, besides denying the scientific realism, results in accepting contradicting theories; Denial of causality, which is due to a misunderstanding of this philosophical concept, destroys any real connections between the objects in the world. Finally, it is concluded that these fundamental criticisms really challenge M-theory’s validity.