Self-defense is the human's natural right, which the one has right to defense himself from overstepping to his life, and other his interests. Self-defense is existence when an unlawful attack is begun or is imminent and defensive action must have been necessary and proportionate to attack. But sometimes, a person exceeds the limits of defense. For example he exceeds the condition of necessary or proportionate. Excessive self-defense is considering in this matter, when the individual wants to defend but, he doesn't observe the conditions of defense.This paper with reviewing Islamic penal code (1392), judgments of national high court and juridical views, tries to consider this subject.

This note studies the legal opinions over the conducts of those who feel the risk of danger from someone with truthful belief and yet reasonable but in reality, it has not been and for this feeling of danger, they defend themselves. What are the legal status and the court judgment about this kind of defense? Generally, there are three opinions about this issue. The first view has placed the behavior of the defendant (perpetrator) in the area of the exclusion of criminal responsibility. The second attitude believe it is self-defense. The third outlook has studied the conducts of such perpetrator as an essential element for committing a crime from the point of the establishment or non-establishment of the Mens Rea. This issue has also examined from the point of the legal system of Iran and the fuqaha (Islamic Jurists) of Imami Shism. Some of them believe the right of self-defense for the putative defendant and some others do not accept it but the legal system of Iran has not taken a clear approach to this subject. The result of the research indicates that putative self-defense can be counted of justifications (justifying reasons) in some conditions such as the fault of the apparent aggressor to make the apparent defendant mistake and the reasonable belief of the apparent defendant that he is in danger and it could be counted of the exclusion of criminal responsibility in some other conditions such as no fault of the apparent aggressor to make the apparent defendant mistake and the reasonable belief of perpetrator that he is in danger.

Scholars rightly believe that prohibiting the threat to or use of force is the most important achievement of the UN charter. Eventhough Article 51 offers an exception in this regard, the letters and substance of this article are clear about an ‘ armed attack’ as a precondition to trigger the right to self-defense. Beside this legal fact, a Preemptive use of force against an imminent threat is endorsed by Customary International Law as well. However, and mainly after the 9/11, a number of countries have used military forces against their oppositions beyond their borders under the article 51 while labeling those groups as terrorist organizations. Supporting this approach, some scholars have argued that an ''extensive interpretation'' of Article 51 could enable states to legally fight terrorist threats beyond their territories under ''Preventive Self-defense. Having thoroughly examined theories & concepts of interpretation, UN and ICJ Jurisprudence, we have argued that none of those sources supports the `Extensive Interpretation` doctrine under the treaty law or customary international law. Reiterating the necessity to offer a well-defined legal mechanism to prevent terroristic threats, we believe the International law may not yet provide a proper answer to this question through ''codification'', and the answer lies in the ''development'' of international law. To this end, the author proposes a triangle criteria test toward a legal use of force against non-imminent terrorist threats beyond national borders.

Abortion is considered both as a crime and a social necessity (at least according to those committing the termination) which roots in socio-cultural and politico-economic conditions. However, abortion might become medically inevitablety, since continuation of the pregnancy may hurt fetus, mother or both of them. Before ensoulment, if the mother’s life is in dander, all Sunni and Shia faqihs (jurisprudents) permit abortion. In case of hardship for the mother, most of the faqihs allow it. Some Sunni faqihs have gone so far as consider it mobah (halal).In case of ensoulment (beginning of human life in the fourth month), traditional Sunni and Shia faqihs do not permit abortion, while some of the contemporary ones authorize it in some special conditions. My article will focus on the case of danger for mother, which, in my opinion, is permitted, as a case of legitimized self-defense, by Sharia and common sense. In case of conflict between two wajibs (obligations), mother has the right to protect herself. So abortion in this case is authorized, and the physician and the nurse will have no civil and penal liability. Although some faqihs do not permit abortion in such cases, some others, with special emphasis on common sense, allow it.

Considering the changes in the provisions of the legitimate defense in the Islamic Penal Code, 92 which, of course, does not change in principle and its effects, therefore, the aim of this research is a comparative study on the legitimate defense approved in 2013 with the previous laws that is being examined. Issues related to the legitimate defense in the Islamic Penal Code, approved in 1392, are set out in Articles 156, 157 and 158. The subject-matter of defense in the new law is also stated in article 156 of this law: life, property, honor, freedom and welfare. According to Article 156 of the Penal Code 2013: "If a person acts as a criminal offense in defending his or her own sentiment, worship, honor, property or liberty, or another, against any current or imminent aggression or imminent danger, in accordance with the rules of defense, In the event of community, the following conditions are not punishable: (A) Behavioral conduct is necessary to eliminate an aggression or danger.B) Documentary defense is reasonable or rational.C) Risk and rape have not been committed due to conscious action or aggression and other defense.(D) It is not practicable to resort to government forces without time of death or their intervention in the elimination of aggression and danger. "This article has three notes, each of which will be examined in its own right.

While an overwhelming majority of states have hitherto not exercised any form of anticipatory self-defense, believing that it may lay foundation for an ominous precedent, the question remains as to why some writers insist on promoting the concept. As of September 11, there have been increasing louder voices pronouncing its legality. Later, the introduction of the so-called preventive self-defense by the US as a part of its National Security Agenda, rested way beyond the traditional interpretation of the Anticipatory Self-Defense. It appears that the historic doctrinal debate has resurfaced with yet stronger vigor. The present article is an attempt to review the legality and re-appraise the debate on the notion of anticipatory self-defense.The article attempts to objectively interpret Article 51 of the Charter in light of the canons of treaty interpretation with the purpose of finding the customary international law of the time. It then reexamines the Caroline formula and affirms that in the absence of widespread and consistent state practice and opinio juris prior to September 11, it has failed to level up or form as a customary rule of international law. The article concludes that although state practice after September 11 tend to condone the use of force against imminent terrorists attacks, Article 51 of the UN Charter still stands as a valid and effective statute prevailing over the use force mechanism; and that regardless of the temporal flaws attributed to the International Community case history, a Charter-based world order may favorably serve even within the context of challenges ahead in 21st century. The article finally concludes that anticipatory self-defense has not been recognized as a standing norm in International law.