Various definitions can be found in the western philosophy regarding analytic propositions (or judgment"). Some of the most important definitions belong to Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Ayer, Mill, Frege, and Quine. According to their scope, such definitions can be classified into three sets: the most particular, particular, and the most general ones. In order to find the correct definition, we have to look for the one which tits best the goals and the foundations of the division of propositions into analytic and synthetic. Having determined the goals and the foundations of these western philosophers, the article shows that their definitions neither satisfy their goals, nor are congruous with their fundamental principles. One of the crucial ends of such a division is dividing facts into intellectual vs. real facts, and differentiating between primary and derived intellectual facts. This goal is the same for predicatory and conditional propositions on the one hand, and for affirmative and negative ones on the other, and for true and false propositions on the third. But all the above-mentioned definitions (among other deficiencies) stay short of encompassing all these propositions. The author suggests an alternative definition, more particular than the most general definition, and still more general that the particular one, compensating for faults of the previous definitions.