Essential primary and TECHNICAL COMMON PREDICATIONs have two meanings equivocally: (1) as a qualification of the subject, (2) as a qualification of the proposition. The meaning which has been proposed by Mulla sadra is the second one and the first meaning, with this title, has gained its COMMON use only after him. To avoid confusing them, one must use each of them in its proper place in every single proposition. The first meaning must be asserted immediately after the subject, since it concerns the concept-referent distinction in the subject. However, the second one must be asserted at the end of the proposition, since both subject and predicate are important in its realization. It shows either they are conceptually the same (conceptual unity) or subject is among the referents of the predicate (extension inclusion). To avoid the contradiction, these two meanings must be mentioned in one proposition simultaneously. For instance, it can be rightly said: “the particular with primary PREDICATION is universal with COMMON PREDICATION” which means “the concept of the particular is among the referents of universal” or it can be rightly said: “the particular with primary PREDICATION is the particular with primary PREDICATION” which means “the concept of particular is the same as the particular conceptually”. By distinction between these two kinds of PREDICATION, Mulla sadra tries to solve some contradictory (paradoxical) instances and his commentators say explicitly that he has added a unity to the eight unities concerning the conditions of occurrence of a contradiction. However, the unity that can be added to the eight conditions is not only the second meaning of these PREDICATIONs, but both of them. Now, according to the two PREDICATIONs concerning the subject and also proposition (as a whole), as well as the quality of the propositions, i.e. affirmation and negation, we come across eight forms of propositions which two by two are contradictory.

On the one hand, in some philosophical writings, an apparently single proposition is regarded as true according to both primary essential PREDICATION and COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION. For example, the proposition "a particular is particular" is considered as true on both the primary PREDICATION and the COMMON PREDICATION. On the other hand, absolute non-existent is on one occasion regarded as true, but on other occasion as false according to the primary PREDICATION. This apparent incoherence has caused a tangle in explaining the abovementioned PREDICATIONs. Some philosophers consider the difference between subject and predicate as the origin of the contrasts in dispute. Examining the objections of this speculation, the present essay presents a new solution based on distinctions between concept and mental being, and between external extension and mental extension, which completely removes the apparent incoherence.  

The present article first presents the historical roots of the division made between synthetic and analytic propositions by Kant and the one made between primary essential and TECHNICAL COMMON PREDICATIONs by Mulla Sadra. Taking a comparative perspective, the article then attempts to answer to the following questions: Are the propositions featuring primary essential PREDICATION the same as analytic propositions? And are the propositions having COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION the same as synthetic propositions. In other words, are these two classifications the same and identical or not?To answer these questions, the aforementioned terms are briefly explained and the two classifications are subsequently compared and contrasted. Finally, the conclusion is made that the two classifications, despite having a lot of similarities are not identical and that the similarities are limited to the general aspects and not the details.

The issue of PREDICATION is one of the significant issue of Islamic philosophy that due to its relation with assertive knowledge of man to the outer world is of importance by which we could explain the relation between object and subject, subject and predicate, and knowledge and the known. Unless the PREDICATION, which indicates the identity and identification, is not made, it is impossible to set any identification and even any comparison to achieve knowledge. In the present essay the attempt is to treat primary essential PREDICATION and COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION as viewed by Sadr al-Muta’allehin and Allame Tabatabayee with respect to the reality of PREDICATION and its place, and with regard to the distinction between the two, their application is stated and in case of any differences, they are explained.

The misconception (shubha) of absolute nonexistent – which we have named as paradox – is not an amusing brainteaser; rather, it is one the significant epistemological issues. Its importance can be looked upon from two different viewpoints: research and educational. It is significant from the research viewpoint because it challenges propositions which constitute the foundation of our thinking and knowledge, propositions such as impossibility of contradiction, vicious circle, and endless chain. It is also significant from the educational viewpoint, since it has been dealt with in the two widely used texts Bidaya and Niḥaya, albeit very briefly. This very brevity and succinctness has been misleading so as it has put the philosophy students into difficulty and confusion and prompted some of the eminent contemporary philosophy researchers to accuse the author of these books as having uttered ramblings. For many years this issue has confounded the minds of many of the intellectuals and challenged them to try to find a solution for it. Sadr al-Muti’allihin Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) – the greatest intellectual of all ages and the unrivalled genius – has dealt with this paradox and the similar propositions in his unique treasure, Asfar, and proposed some solutions which can be traced back to the writings of others, as well. In this article, I first made a study of the background of the paradox of absolute nonexistent and delved into the paradoxes parallel to it in nature and destiny, and then clarified Mulla Sadra's responses by exploring his words and indicated that he has given two responses in solving this paradox. Next, in light of these responses, I proceeded to reappraise ‘Allama Tabataba’i (ra)'s words in order to reveal that, although succinct and ambiguous, his words are far from being labeled as rambling. Finally, after giving a report and assessment of post-Mulla Sadra researches, I picked out one of his two responses, as well as a solution by one of the intellectuals preceding him, which with certain rephrasing and restructuring, I regarded as qualified.

There are three theories regarding the quality of ascription of essential on essence and on each other. Most logicians consider that ascription of genus and differentia on the genre and on each other is COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION. But according to Allameh Tabatabai, the genus is the same as the ambiguous genre and the differentia is the same the determined genre and the genre is the complete essence without ambiguity and actuality. Contrary to popularity, therefore, he considers ascription of genus and differentia on the genre is primary essential PREDICATION but ascription of genus and differentia on each other is COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION. But Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, one step ahead of Allameh Tabatabaee, considers that ascription of genus and differentia on the genre and on each other is primary essential PREDICATION. In this article, while explaining all three perspectives, we first criticize them and finally we conclude that the famous theory is correct.

To solve the problem of mental existence, Avicenna emphasized that the definition of substance is that its external existence (fi al-aʿ, yā, n) does not need a subject. The mentioned definition applies to both mental and external substances. He concluded by adding ‘, its external existence is not in a subject’,to the definition of substance that, on the one hand, the same meaning is reflected in the mental existence of the substance and, on the other hand, the same mental substance is a quality of the soul, that is an accident,so that the problem of ‘, single essence under two categories’,will not occur. Mulla Sadra put forward two responses to the problem of mental existence. The first one was based on the theory of the earliest philosophers and the acceptance of incarnate dependence, because of which it would be consistent with Avicenna’, s opinion. However, Mulla Sadra said that Avicenna, by adding the ‘, fi al-aʿ, yā, n’,to the definition of substance, had confined the substantiality to individual substances, which requires the opposition between reality and mentality. Mulla Sadra’, s second response is based on the emanative dependence in which the mental existence is considered a product of the soul, in which case, the problem of single essence under two categories will not occur in the first place. This view cannot be reconciled with Avicenna’, s solution which is based on incarnate dependence. A Careful look at Avicenna’, s statements, however, will show that Mulla Sadra’, s criticism of him may be defended by making some qualifications and explanations so that we find out that Avicenna’, s analysis had prepared the ground for Mulla Sadra’, s first response to the problem by distinguishing tautological PREDICATION and COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION.

AbstractWith regard to the division of carrying, into the primary essential PREDICATION and COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION , there have been differences of opinion in determining examples and matching with types, among others, there are opinions about the quality of PREDICATION the essentials together and on the essence. It is well-known that carrying genus and differentia on species of each other is a COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION. Allameh Tabatabai considers the PREDICATION of genus and differentia to each other COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION and the PREDICATION of genus and differentia to species as the primary essential PREDICATION, as some like Allameh Javadi Amoli have introduced the PREDICATION of genus and differentia to each other and the PREDICATION of genus and differentia to type as the primary essential PREDICATION. It is possible that Allameh Tabatabai's point of view may be criticized and challenged, but it seems that according to the basis of Allameh's point of view, the criticisms raised can be answered. In this article, while analyzing the basis of Allameh in PREDICATION the essentials on the essence, some problems raised at the level of the theory have been investigated.Key words: Allameh Tabatabaei, primary essential PREDICATION COMMON TECHNICAL

Anselm’s Argument, one of the oldest arguments for the existence of God, has often been rejected by Muslim philosophers. Their primary reason for this rejection is the confusion between primary essential PREDICATION (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) and COMMON TECHNICAL PREDICATION (al-ḥaml al al-shāyeʿ). The core of their objection is that no concept can generate its instance; in other words, the mere presence of a concept does not entail its actual existence. However, a closer examination of Anselm’s reasoning for the supposed entailment between "conceiving of the greatest being" and "his actual existence" may render this objection invalid. According to Anselm, the aforementioned principle has a unique exception—specifically, when existence is included within the very concept itself. Muslim philosophers neither critique Anselm’s justification for this exception nor engage directly with the content of his claim; rather, they simply merely deny Anselm's claim. Kant, on the other hand, addresses Anselm’s rationale for this exception. From Kant’s perspective, Anselm's exception lies in treating existence as a predicate that describes external objects—an idea that Kant explicitly rejects.

The existential argument in contemporary Islamic philosophy has been criticized on the basis of one of the initiatives and innovations in this philosophy. This innovation is about discussing propositions and their division and the condition of contradiction. This critique is more concerned with Anselm's argument. But it also includes other narratives of the existential argument, especially Descartes. Javadi Amoli, one of the commentators and followers of Sadr al-Muta'allehin of Shiraz, made a relevant criticism. The main aim of the present study is to analyze Javadi Amoli's critique of the existential argument, in addition to the author's critique and evaluation. One of the authors' critiques and evaluations has also been proposed and criticized by the author of this study. Although the aim of this study apparently has two components: the author's evaluation from Javadi Amoli's point of view and the author's evaluation of one of the author's critique of Javadi Amoli, this duality is purely apparent and the research problem is the same. The study confirms Javadi Amoli's critique of the existential argument based on the difference between the two predictions. As a result of this evaluation, the extent to which this critique needs to be reviewed and, at the same time, its resilience to criticism is explained.