Anthropology has been regarded as one of the most important branches of knowledge and, it has been of considerable effect on humanistic and religious fields of studies. Presenting an analytical study of the Quiddity of anthropology would be established on the basis of its background, definition, necessity and various kinds. Considerably known is the fact that anthropology has been divided into philosophical, religious, scientific, mystical and ethical, all but the religious one being exposed to some crises. It cannot be found any crisis in the religious anthropology.

The present article is an attempt to clarify Mirdamad’s views on ‘existence’ and ‘Quiddity’ and the relationship between the two. To this end, this great philosopher’s explicit view on ‘the fundamental reality of Quiddity’ and meaning, the ontological position of ‘existence’ and ‘Quiddity’, the bases upon which one can posit the mentally-based position of existence and the real nature of fundamentally real Quiddity are clarified.....

Islamic architecture is a recurring term in research on Islamic art and civilization. A wide range of works made in the Islamic world has been named with this word and scholars have tried to define and mention its features, in which, there is almost no relationship between Islam as a divine religion and architecture, and only the characteristics of buildings are mentioned. In this research, came to light by descriptive-analytical study method based on gathering of information in the library, after the analyses of the definitions of Islamic architecture, two questions are asked about it: what it is and when did this form of architecture begin and end. Therefore, based on the inference from Quranic verses and religious doctrine, Islamic architecture refers to a type of architecture that, rather than seeking a specific shape and form, should help Muslims to achieve perfection and the ultimate goal of human creation, which is to worship God. This kind of architecture started at the same time with the mission of the Holy Prophet “ PBUH” and will continue until the end and will not be limited to a specific region and a specific time.

In the recent decades, some people have tried to define ‘Islamic art’, but seemingly these efforts have not led to an obvious definition and explanation. In this article, we claim that it would be better to retreat and, before trying to make a definition of ‘Islamic art’, to philosophically analyze this concept. Then, by means of this method, we would clarify that, in order to be able to speak justifiably of ‘Islamic art’, about what fundamental problems we should determine our positions first; problems such as: “What is the meaning of ‘art’ in ‘Islamic art’?” “Does ‘art’ has the capacity to ascribe ‘Islamic’ to it?” “Which definition of art does ‘Islamic Art’ demand?” “What is the relation of ‘Islamic art’ to beauty?” Contemplation on these problems has, at least, this benefit that it makes clear the limits to be observed in order to speak of ‘Islamic art’ and to make a definition of it. Firstly, not every definition of art can be considered as a foundation, because according to some conceptions of art it may conflict with ‘being Islamic’. Secondly, ‘Islamic art’ must determine its position, specifically its ontological position, towards the concept of beauty: Is beauty the objective quality of things or their subjective quality? The critical problems here are that, on the one hand, accepting that beauty is subjective conflicts with the essential beauty of God in Islam; and, on the other hand, accepting that beauty is objective leads us to some theoretical difficulties. Therefore, the advocate of ‘Islamic art’ must overcome both problems. And thirdly, not any adjective can be ascribed to any noun, and there are some considerable limits as such. Therefore, such limits must be considered in ascribing ‘Islamic’ to ‘art’.

through the various eras of the history of philosophy, Ordinary Quiddity has had several meanings and the philosophical terms in Farabi’s philosophy, as a bridge between Aristotle and Avicenna, do not present pose or repute perfectly their aspects and necessities.In spite of its distinction for Farabi Ordinary type Quiddity is melded with and close to Existence. The evidence for This claim in Farabi’s writings is where he called Quiddity “What the entity is”, “What the entity existence depends on” or “The dole of existence belong to the entity” where Quiddity’s parts designate parts of entity existence. According to Farabi the absence of Quiddity is the criteria of not existing and possessing an exposal Quiddity is the criteria of existing. Therefore for the necessary Existent he affirms Ordinary type unity between his existence and his Quiddity instead of his rejecting Quiddity. In addition to “What is it?” Quiddity is the answer to the questions of “Quality”, “Is it?” and “Due to what”. Moreover Farabi uses “essence”, “nature”, “substance” (correlatively), “thatness”, “definition” and occasionally “reality” in the same way.

A Muslim (specifically Shia) For its practice based religion (Apart from the epistemic and beliefs), must act on the basis of the "practical treatise". This treatise determines the five types of verbs of a Muslim (obligatory, Mustahab, mobah, makroh and haram). Today, human life is beyond the Individual life, and the social and political life has become an impartible part of Muslim life. Especially in Iran, and with the victory of the Islamic Revolution, this area of life has become more significant in society. The question that arises here is whether in the realm of social life, and in particular in the realm of political life, it is possible to speak of treatises that act like action treatises in the realm of individual life. That is, determining the five types of Muslim behavior in the political arena. Explaining the nature of this treatise based on their characteristics and their necessity is the main focus of this paper.

Governmental fiqh (jurisprudence), one of the main issues of philosophy of fiqh (jurisprudence) is a holistic approach which is based on the maximal view on religion. Governmental jurisprudence is considered as a method and approach vis-à-vis individualistic fiqh (jurisprudence) and a general description governing all types of jurisprudence. That is, when jurist wants to infer religious injunctions, he considers the act of enforcing rules in the context of an Islamic governmental system which represents an institution to manage the society. The present paper mainly deals with the "Quiddity, reason and manner" of governmental fiqh (jurisprudence). When discussing Quiddity, it elaborates on the nature of governmental jurisprudence, when discussing reason it expounds its necessity and when manner is in question, the method and process to achieve it are discussed. Using an analytical approach, this paper tries to reanalyze and elaborate on the aspects of this extremely important issue in Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) by referring to the views of such great jurists like Imam Khomeini (May God’s mercy be on him) who has revived the theoretical dimension of governmental jurisprudence and established the Islamic Republic in modern century on the basis of the practical dimension of governmental fiqh.

there have been several views by Muslim scholars on the Quiddity of theoretical and practical reason and how they function in the understanding of practical sentences. One view considers theoretical reason; the understanding of the basis of all general theories, including theoretical and practical reasons, and practical reason considers the principle of partial practical and also determinants of action (Ibn Sian’ s view). The other view considers the theoretical reason only as the understanding of the theoretical sentences and considers the practical reason as the understanding of the general and partial practical sentences and considers as the instigator the act’ s doing. (Al-Tusi’ s view and al-Ghazali in Maqasid al-Falasifa). The third view considers theoretical reason as both the theoretical and the general and partial practical sentences, and considers the practical reason to be the sole agent of action and the temptation of it. (Bahmanyar’ s view, Qutb al-Din al-Razi, and al-Ghazali’ s in Miar al-Elm). The present article, by explaining the angles of these three perspectives and analyzing the speeches in this regard, argues that the right view is the second view and that the practical reason is two kinds. One deals with generalities, which is the equivalent of theoretical reason, but understands general practical understanding. Another deals with details that understand both the practical details and how to do and deal with them.

According to presupposition rule ascribing a quality to anything presupposes its subject. One instance of this rule is the ascription of being to Quiddity which raise objections from early times among Islamic philosophers and received different answers. Having examined these arguments Mulla Sadra offered four responses to the above-mentioned problem: 1. This not the case for application of presupposition rule since existential proposition indicates the reality of something not a ascription of something to another. 2. The rule of presupposition applies only to the accidents of existence not to those of quiddities. 3. According to the fundamental reality of existence Quiddity has no true reality so as to be subject to the presupposition rule. 4. Reason can consider Quiddity as such devoid of any external or even mental subsistence therefore Quiddity lacks any form of reality and cannot be a case for presupposition rule.

Despite the fact that the principality of existence is one of the most important and fundamental philosophical issues that is at the center of the intellectual and philosophical attention of Sadr al-Muta’alehin and many of the important philosophical issues are based on it, unfortunately lack of a precise separation of the ontological and epistemological issues in the texts of Islamic philosophy and Sadraian philosophy has affected on this issue itself and its consequences, as it has affected on the ambiguity and complexity of many philosophical issues and on the clarity of intentions of our philosophers, as well. While presenting the history with the separating the epistemological and ontological aspects of this issue on the bases and phrases of Sadr al-Muta’allihIn in a descriptive-analytical method, in this article, we have tried to find out this issue and study his correct interpretation of the basicality of existence and fictitiousness of the Quiddity from ontological and epistemological aspects and explain the epistemological use of Quiddity.