In this paper we show that the prime saturated prefilter monads are sup-dense and interpolating in saturated prefilter monads. It follows that CNS spaces are the lax algebras for prime saturated prefilter monads. As for the algebraic part, we prove that the Eilenberg-Moore algebras for saturated prefilter monads are exactly continuous I-lattices.

This present article is concerned with the different ontological and epistemological meanings of Reason in Proclus’ philosophy. From his viewpoint, reality is a complex system of different orders.Proclus like other Neo-Platonists, unlike Aristotle, believed that truth is real and Reason, in addition to its epistemological position, has an ontological function. The article first reviews the different kinds of reason and their epistemological function and then explains the ontological and epistemological functions of logos as the central type of Reason.

In this article we recast some of the results developped in articles [19, 22] but in the setup of cubical geometry. Thus we define a monad on CSets whose algebras are models of cubical weak 1-groupoids with connections. In addition, we define a monad on the category CSets × CSets whose algebras are models of cubical weak 1-functors, and a monad on the category CSets × CSets × CSets × CSets whose algebras are models of cubical weak 1-natural transformations.

This study was conducted at Eldebeibat area in South Kordofan State, Sudan. The aim of this study was to assess the role of competition on rangelands utilization in the occurrence of conflicts between land users in the semi-arid areas of Eldebeibat, Sudan. Two target questionnaires were designed to collect data from two groups of land users namely nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers that are using the area. The data were analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). The results showed that illiteracy was high in both groups. The crop production was the main source of income in the sedentary communities while pastoralists practiced cultivation beside livestock rising at the same time. However, both groups preferred raising mixed species of livestock in their herd structure. In addition, it was found that milk production represented the main goal of livestock keeping for the both groups. The results also indicated that the main reason of the livestock health deterioration was shortage of forage. Moreover, pastoralists followed the restricted routes to practice grazing. All respondents included in this study considered the occurrence of conflicts among them as a normal phenomenon and the causes of conflicts are different between them. Most of the nomad pastoralists considered blockage of routes of livestock movement by farms as the main cause of conflicts whereas sedentary groups attributed the occurrence of conflicts for damaging their farms by pastoralists’ livestock for entrance to and exit from grazing land and during grazing that was increased during rainy seasons in particular. The two groups resort to traditional local administration (Godeyah) for reconciliation and solving the conflicts among them.

In this work, we describe an adjunction between the comma category of Set-based monads under the V -powerset monad and the category of associative lax extensions of Set-based monads to the category of V -relations. In the process, we give a general construction of the Kleisli extension of a monad to the category of V -relations.

The paper has intended to reply the question: do Sadra and Leibniz view man to be of a natural perception of God? Why and how? Two meanings of the natural knowledge of God, therefore, has been referred to. One is the self-evident knowledge presented in the proposition: God does exist and the other, a natural awareness of God as the Origin of creation. The philosophers, both, have emphasized human natural perception of God. Yet, Leibniz believes in human soul as a higher monad with a natural concept of God, Sadra, on the other hand, argues for nonconceptual knowledge of God. Again, both the philosophers have made a distinction between simple and compound perception, have proved human natural knowledge to God and known it to be potential.

The concept of free-will is an important and old philosophical issue that most religions have paid attention to, and philosophers of religion have contemplated on the issue adopting a new perspective. The present article is an attempt to present, review and criticize Leibniz’ s view, and tries to answer the question whether, in Leibnitz philosophical system, man has free will or whether it is a sort of Spinosian practical necessity that govern it? Leibniz, in order not to renounce man’ s free-will, divides necessity into two types: the supernatural necessity (geometrical) and the moral necessity. God is qualified with the attribute of goodness and so, in the creation of creatures, He will observe the ideal of perfection, and the necessity of this consideration is the power of choice. Creatures are only conditioned by necessity, and the necessity is not inherent to them, and this positive necessity stablishes their authority. Allameh Tabatabaii also considers free-will as an instinctive phenomenon and states that the rule of the necessity of an object not available does not contradict free-will.

In this paper, drawing on Leibniz’s works and Robert Brandom’s inferentialist reading in his 1981 essay “Leibniz and Degrees of Perception,” the concept of perception, its degrees of clarity, and the relation between these degrees and apperception (consciousness) in Leibniz’s philosophy are examined, along with their role in the individuation of monads. The main issue explored is the function of perceptual clarity in differentiating monads and the relation between clarity of perception and consciousness. In other words, if all perceptions are in some sense distinct, why are not all monads equally conscious? Brandom’s view, through his inferentialist interpretation of perception and the introduction of the notion of a “discursive domain,” treats perceptions as inferentially contentful, considering greater inferential richness to constitute greater distinctness of perception. On this basis, a model emerges that, while preserving the principle that each monad represents the entire world, explains the varying degrees of monadic consciousness and the distribution of expressive content among them. Furthermore, in this model, apperception (consciousness) is regarded as a higher-order perception that determines the content of lower-order perception; thus, consciousness is conceived as an expanded form of perception, and not every distinct perception is necessarily conscious. Ultimately, this study offers a model for understanding the difference between perception and consciousness, clarifies certain interpretive ambiguities in Leibniz’s philosophy, and responds to objections such as the problem of “bare monads.”

In 2010, J. Climent Vidal and J. Soliveres Tur developed, among other things, a pair of 2-adjunctions between the 2-category of adjunctions and the 2-category of monads. One is related to the Kleisli adjunction and the other to the Eilenberg-Moore adjunction for a given monad. Since any 2-adjunction induces certain natural isomorphisms of categories, these can be used to classify bijections and isomorphisms for certain structures in monad theory. In particular, one important example of a structure, lying in the 2-category of adjunctions, where this procedure can be applied to is that of a lifting. Therefore, a lifting can be characterized by the associated monad structure, lying in the 2-category of monads, through the respective 2-adjunction. The same can be said for Kleisli extensions. Several authors have been discovered this type of bijections and isomorphisms but these pair of 2-adjunctions can collect them all at once with an extra property, that of naturality.

The present article discusses the issue of whether soul and body in the Leibniz philosophy are homogeneous or not, whether they influence each other, and how their conformity is explained, in other words, the article studies and analyzes Leibniz's ideas about the connection between soul and body. To this end, a few articles written by Leibniz, particularly monadology and discourses on metaphyics and some of his letters such as those written to Clark an Arneau and also the works of his expositors such as the expositions by Latta, Russel and Ishigora have been studied carefully, and the materials concerning soul and body have been extracted and analyzed resulting in the following:  1. Iebniz believes that soul and body are homogeneous, and soul is the ruling monad while body is a collection of subordinate monads, however, one cannot agree with this leibniz’s idea, because no proof exists to establish the monad, and if soul is to be a ruling monad, it is necessary that in some cases body hs considered as the soul. 2. There is no mutual influence between soul and body in leibniz philosophy, and their conformity is merely explained by the principle of pre-established harmony, however, this idea requires saying by coercion and loss of the best reason for establishing the soul.3. Combination of soul and body is inclusive at the level of monads and unanimous at the level of phenomena and establishment of this idea is based on the establishment of the monad theory and the definition offered by leibniz about soul and body.4. Soul is present throughout body, however, its presence does not mean diffusion.