As the title suggests this article is about determinism and fate in Rumi's Mathnawi. The writer attempts to study Rumi's criteria in evaluating determinism and fate separately. Then the writer proceeds with presenting his impression based on some excerpts from Rumi's works.

Background Because of the highlighted role of ethical responsibility in social and individual life, it is looked as an important issue in ethics area. Social responsibility that is defined as a sub-factor of ethical responsibility will have such an important place. What is discussed in responsibility discussions commonly is the “ human will” . Responsibility is more based on the free will. In the public society, someone who is determined is not responsible. Therefore, responsibility and human will are closely depended together. On the other hand each definition of will is related to the determinism. There is various kind of determinism and social determinism is one of them. Perspectives that focus on social situations as determiners of situations disregard the human will and they are believe in social determinism. According to these issues, this study attempts to consider the social and individual responsibility against social determinism Conclusion By disregarding or minimizing the concept of human will, determinism disregarded the concept of ethical responsibility in our social and individual life. Such events have broad consequences for social and individual life.

The question of determinism or free will has been a challenging problem in theology. Shi'i and Mu'tazili theologians defend free will and Asha'ri's defend determinism and sometimes give a theory named Kasb (acquirement) in this relation. Fakhre Razi is a great Ash'ari theologian. But he attemts to avoid pure determinism. In this paper we show how he tries to combine human power and freedom with determination that originates from divine omnipower. We will discuss that sometime he moves from Kasb theory to the theory of amrun bayn al-amrayn (a thing between determinism and free will), which is a characteristic of shi'i theology. But he cannot explain this theory. So he remains on the dilmma of determinism and free will and cannot give a clear explanation in this relation.

Compulsion and choice are one of the significant issues of theology; and from a long time ago, it has been paid attention to with different viewpoints; each of the followers of the different beliefs has dealt with this issue according to his own specific idea. One of the famous viewpoints in this regard is that of the mystics, which has a widespread reflection in the literal-mystical heritage. Mowlavi, as one of the theoreticians of this issue, deals with it in Mathnavi Ma'navi through anecdotes and proverbs, which is the Quranic method. In this article, the background of the theological discussions and its effect on the Iranian's culture and thoughts, as well as on Mowlavi's mystical viewpoints, are investigated. He poses such issues as cause and signification, providing causes and removing them, the relationship between compulsion and trust to show that Allah's specific compulsion is the sign of man's weakness and finally of the compulsion. With reference to the man's regret and shame for what he has done, he also introduces man as a creature with a conscious choice.

The way God intervenes in the natural world is considered a major and long-standing issue in the realm of theology and philosophy of religion where efforts to resolve it has led to proposing various and, at times, opposing views, spanning from determinism to delegation. By employing a novel criterion to distinguish between various divine actions in the world, the current paper attempts to present and assess Allamah Tabatabaei’ s approach as an Islamic determinist philosopher in regard to the topic and seeks to lay the groundwork for offering solutions in both deterministic and indeterministic models by revisiting the causal homogeneity principle in order to find a way out of dominant intellectual impediments. To that end, the paper serves to show that by extending the concept of causal homogeneity within a deterministic framework, one can attest to the direct interference of immaterial entities in the material world, whereas by resting upon the ‘ principle of causal necessity’ and a particular attitude towards the principle of homogeneity within an indeterministic framework, one can defend the interference of immaterial causes in order to realize one of the possible probabilities.

The distinction between the realm of substance and that of attributes is represented in Spinoza's ethics by means of a method known as dialectic. The most outstanding characteristic of this method is that it investigates various opposing aspects of an issue in relation to each other. Therefore, in a ethics, determinism is studied in terms of its relation to freedom. Although the subject of this article revolves around the relationship between determinism and freedom, it goes without saying that Spinoza studies such concepts as infinity, finitude, individual, society, part and whole in the same way.

With no doubt, the element by which we are permitted to admire or blame one for his good or bad actions is freedom. But what the essence of freedom is and how human being can get it, in a world governed by causal determinism, are two questions which most moral philosophers in west have discussed. In this regard some of them believe that compatibility between freedom and causal determinism is impossible, so they have denied one of them in the favor of the other and have established incompatibilism. In contrary, some others, from modern era up now, have tried to make them compatible, in order to revival moral responsibility and prevent from falling in randomness. This view has been called compatibilism. This article studies compatibilism from the viewpoints of philosophers’ such as Hobbes, Hume, Ayer, Frankfurt, Watson, Wolf and Fischer. Finally this paper it cleared that despite the rightness of compatibilism, because of their unsuccessfulness in proposing a true explanation of human freedom and moral responsibility, compatibilists have failed to show that this view is reasonable and justified.