Virtue is of the most important ethical concepts and among those few words including ethical propositions. Aristotle has divided virtues into two ethical and intellectual classes with regard to their purposes. It was known for him that intellectual virtues were stable features of soul which are used by the purpose of recognizing reality (truth). In virtue-oriented epistemology approach which has been developed during the recent decades, it has been emphasized on epistemological values of intellectual virtues and their role in the truth of beliefs. However, there is not an equal perspective about these virtues in various varieties of this approach. For Sosa they are known as types of power and epistemological talents, but for Zagzebski they are deemed as behavioral features and personality characteristics and as their subcategories of ethical virtues. Although he chooses the Aristotle view about intellectual virtues, he does not accept separation of intellectual and ethical virtues. Analyzing various approaches on intellectual virtues, this paper attempts to investigate Zagzebski’s reasons in equalizing intellectual virtues and ethical ones.

Three approaches of theism, atheism and agnosticism have been the focus of the philosophy of religion with a great deal of controversies. Adherents of each one try to overcome the opposing argument and to prove its own claim. One of the necessary predispositions for arbitration between these claims is determining the dominant pattern and evaluation criteria among which evidentialism, fideism, reformed epistemology, and advisable and pragmatist approaches are considered as examples of these criteria. Virtueoriented epistemology is a modern approach highlighting the function of rational virtues in epistemic value of the beliefs. According to this approach, it is known that the way of connecting belief to truth is the fact that it is originated from practicing rational virtues. Therefore, to evaluate epistemic value of every belief, the quality and quantity of the mentioned virtues in the operating epistemic process should be detected. Having an overall investigation on the prevalent types of arbitration between theism and atheism and also providing a short report on virtue-oriented epistemology narrated by Zagzebski, the paper intends to show epistemic value of believing in God against the lack of it based on the mentioned approach.

Knowledge is one of the most important achievements of human being in confrontation with phenomena and facts which he acquires through his cognitive faculties. Throughout the history of philosophy, there was always this confusion that whether our beliefs are influenced by non-epistemic areas and external elements or not; and if so, is it epistemologically acceptable and intelligible or the agent should avoid these effects. Zagzebski, one of the modern epistemologists, who is known often by his theory of “virtue epistemology”. In the process of theorizing, he speaks of non-epistemic elements as the foundations of knowledge. Feelings and emotions, virtues and vices, human will and social backgrounds are some of the most important elements which she mentions and constructs her theory on them.This article will analyze these elements and process of their impacts on formation of knowledge.

By comparison of Mula Sadra's epistemological theory with virtual epistemological theories of Zagzebski and Plantinga, we could conclude that the former’s theory can be categorized as a virtual epistemology. On the other hand Plantinga believes in the virtue of faculties of generative; and Zagzebski believes in function of intellectual power in forming episteme.In fact, both of them believe in some aspects of the elements that effect on formation and development of belief. So none of the above mentioned theories are free from objection. But Mula Sadra, on the other hand, in his epistemological thought believes in influence of moral faculties function on intellectual faculties, and their interactive function in forming belief and truth conductivity process. Plantinga argues that only the generating faculties of belief could form beliefs; while Zagzebski and Mula Sadra also argue that moral faculties prepare the ground for formation of true beliefs, but they believe this is ethical faculties that provide a suitable context for true belief. Moreover, Mula Sadra proposes reliability and truth conductivity processes of revelation and inspiration as two other processes that form reliable and true beliefs.

controlled Intellectual virtues are stable traits of human ego, that are used to examine the truth (the preoccupation of the mind). Zagzebski considered intellectual virtues to be the characteristics of an admirable intellectual personality that have two components of motivation and credible success. This article seeks to look at the nature of intellectual virtues and their educational implications in the teaching of thought through an analytical approach from Zagzebsky's perspective. While analyzes show that Admirable personality traits that are sufficiently acquired and controlled by the cognitive factor are valuable in themselves and should be developed with principles such as direct reference to examples, emphasis on the psycho-motivational structure of individuals and their admiration, the growth of critical thinking. He taught philosophy, creative creativity, and methods such as reading, narration, and direct imitation of virtues and virtues.

Extended AbstractIntroductionA model for the epistemology of religious belief is Zagzebski’s virtue epistemology. It evaluates religious beliefs in terms of intellectual virtues such as understanding, wisdom (phronesis), and doxastic characters. A belief is stable and valid if its subject possesses intellectual virtues. We might embark on evaluating religious beliefs, particularly monotheism, God’s existence, and His attributes based on virtue renderings of intuitions and illuminations. Intuitions and illuminations are processes through which one achieves rational flourishing in light of wisdom. Both Suhrawardī and Zagzebski draw on intellectual virtues, particularly wisdom, to account for religious beliefs. In such an evaluation, instead of beliefs, believers are evaluated. Zagzebski’s account gives way to two readings: in terms of understanding and in terms of wisdom. This article deals with the role of wisdom in evaluating religious beliefs. This reading might be thought of as a version of Suhrawardī’s view of religious beliefs, particularly the belief in God. In a recapitulation of his view, Suhrawardī insists that attainment of genuine knowledge is enabled through theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom, intuitions and revelations, and possession of moral and intellectual virtues (Suhrawardī 1993, vol. 2; also see Zagzebski 1996, 1993a, 1993b, 2000, 2011). There has been research on religious beliefs in Iran in the last decade, but none of these studies has talked about the rationality of religious belief in the light of wisdom with all its aspects and independently. Therefore, the present research is novel in this connection, and its main contribution is its discussion of the virtue of wisdom according to Suhrawardī and Zagzebski.MethodThe method of this research is descriptive-analytic. It is based on Lakatos’s research program. The research is focused on wisdom and its role in choosing beliefs. Its positive strategy is the epistemic authority of the self and others in choosing beliefs, and its negative strategy is the critique of rival theories such as radical fideism and strong rationalism.  Results and Discussion This article begins with an overview of the epistemic foundations of Suhrawardī and Zagzebski:(a) Intellectual virtues as modeled upon virtue ethics, (b) rational faculties or powers are not the only belief-forming powers. Indeed, moral faculties or powers play a reciprocal role in the formation and reception of beliefs, (c) an epistemic subject has both epistemic and moral duties, (d) just as we have an epistemic trust in our own rational and moral faculties, we have an epistemic trust in other people, (e) the will or motivation to attain the truth is as relevant to moral virtues as it is to intellectual virtues, (f) giving up on the scientific-empirical model of epistemology and tuning to the specialized model of religious epistemology, (g) extension of objects of religious beliefs from propositional to non-propositional facts, (h) taking into consideration the external and internal dimensions of knowledge-conferring character of non-epistemic factors in attainment of genuine knowledge, (i) special consideration of wisdom in reception of genuine knowledge, instead of explanation or justification of beliefs. A wise person is one who possesses moral and intellectual virtues, through which he or she decide under certain circumstances what is the right thing to believe or to do. Intuitions are crucial to the process of attaining wisdom. A wise person deploys intuitions, particularly rational intuitions, to make proper decisions about accepting or denying a belief or act.ConclusionThere have been different versions of rational evaluation and stability of religious beliefs, including foundationalism, coherentism, and fideism. What matters is that the believer possesses moral and intellectual virtues to attain the beliefs that are proper to wise people. To take a wise person as a role model can pave the path for attainment of valid beliefs. In their virtue-theoretic framework, Suhrawardī and Zagzebski propose that a wise person, possessing spiritual virtues, is a superior model for those who seek genuine knowledge so that they can attain wisdom. Both Suhrawardī and Zagzebski begin with reflective reasons, and then turn to theoretical reasons. The highest degree of belief in monotheism, God’s existence, and His attributes can be attained in light of wisdom.

Virtue-based epistemological theories are a branch of externalist epistemology. These theories introduced by Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski are among these theories. They believe that virtue has a notable role in the formation of true belief. In addition, the elements of reliable process, epistemic power with the right function, will, responsibility, and so on, are leading to the value of belief. Ibn Sina and Mula Sadra have highlighted the effects of virtue, virtual power, reliable process, will, responsibility, and the like on knowledge. Virtue based reading of their epistemology highlights many similarities between Ibn Sian, Mula Sadra, and Zagzebski’ s opinions. Mula Sadra’ s theory, compared to that of Ibn Sian, is more consistent with contemporary virtue-based theories. Ibn Sian’ s theory, on the other hand, is closer to Aristotle’ s theory of the interaction between virtue and knowledge. Moreover, observation of ethical elements in knowledge is consistent with Mula Sadra’ s philosophical bases. On the other hand, Ibn Sina’ s theory of knowledge is inconsistent with some of his philosophical bases in terms of observing ethical elements.