The method of metaphysics: Metaphysics is empirical but depends not, like the sciences, on recondite experience but on close attention to aspects of everyday experience we ordinarily scarcely notice. "Real" is a broader concept than "exists" (which applies only to particulars) and also applies to phenomena, kinds, and laws, which are real, but not, of course, existent entities. But "there are real kinds, laws, etc." doesn't imply that all the kinds and laws we believe are real, are. I call my approach "Innocent Realism" because--though it's certainly not naive--it requires attending to experience, so far as possible, without substantial preconceptions. There is one real world, enormously varied but also integrated. It includes physical stuff, kinds, laws, etc. and, here on earth, a vast array of human artifacts, physical, social, intellectual, and imaginative, all intimately interconnected. All this requires human mindedness (a better word than "mind" because it doesn't suggest that human mentality is an organ like the heart or the liver). Rather, it's a complex congeries of dispositions and abilities: to understand even such a relatively simple thing as what's involved in someone's believing something, we need to take account of the person's dispositions to behavior, verbal and otherwise; to the neurophysiological realizations of these dispositions; and to their connections to the world and to words in the person's linguistic community--this last requiring other people's words-world connection. "Virtual" reality is just one more computer artifact, clever, no doubt, but not metaphysically startling. It's oversold, but this is advertising hype, not serious metaphysics.

In modem literature, the condition of mankind is depicted using elements such as abnormality and folly. Realism, which tries to depict reality, is the literature of modem era in contemporary times. Realism is not only a style among other literary schools, but it is also the rudiment of literature, for other literary styles, particulary in recent centuries, have originated from reality or is conspicuously related to it. One can clearly witness this aspect of Realism in the works of Franz Kafka, Thomas Mann and Bertold Brecht. Therefore, regarding authors ideology and choice of styles in their works, they are in and/or should deal with a very crucial and grave condition.

Hilary Putnam, who was once one of the representatives and proponents of scientific and metaphysical Realism, became an unrelenting opponent of metaphysical Realism during the mid-70s. Having argued against alethic and ontological dimensions of metaphysical Realism, he proposed “internal Realism” as an alternative to it. Putnam’s major objection to the alethic dimension of metaphysical Realism was that this philosophy brings about an unbridgeable gap between the truth of a proposition and our epistemic justifications for it. As to the ontological dimension of metaphysical Realism, he proposed the criticism to the effect that according to this philosophical position the world consists of “readymade” objects. Putnam poses these criticisms because, as he argues, firstly, truth cannot be considered anything but the ideal justification; and secondly, the world is not made of ready-made objects, but rather it is we that cut up the world into different objects when we take a conceptual scheme. Indeed, according to Putnam assuming any “external perspective”, whether about truth or about ontology, is meaningless. Having introduced and reviewed Putnam’s arguments in rejecting metaphysical Realism, this article explains and examines the basic elements of internal Realism. The results of this article show that Putnam’s objections against metaphysical Realism lack the necessary credibility and strength; and at the same time his proposed alternative (internal Realism) has serious problems that made to be addressed. By his chosen conception of truth, internal Realism, cannot touch its stated purpose; i.e. the removal of a huge gap between the truth of a statement and our knowledge of it. The ontological claims of internal Realism are not, indeed, the reliable and true consequences of the thesis of conceptual relativity, which is considered as Putnam’s main base in this regard, but rather it is more a consequence of mistaking the linguistic issues with ontological ones.

Among the most basic discussions in epistemology are those related to ideas and concepts. In the present writing, we are trying to find out the features of theoretical concepts or terms as well as observational concepts. We are to find out whether the theoretical concepts are true concepts in principle or untrue ones like fairy tales and monsters or conventional concepts. In other words, must we choose Realism or unRealism in the realm of theoretical concepts? What about the realm of observational concepts? And finally, what is the status of such concepts in the classification system of concepts and ideas? Undoubtedly, this discussion is among the most important and most basic epistemological discussions in the realm of concepts and ideas, through which the scientific propositions, laws and theories are organized. In the present study, we explore such a difficulty and pursue the related solution.

In this paper, discussing the position of Realism and antiRealism in meta-ethics, first we will explain different versions of moral Realism. Then we will discuss Kant's moral teachings to determine his attitude concerning these versions. Moral Realism and anti-Realism has a strong relation to cognitivism and noncognitivism in meta-ethics. So we will discuss shortly moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism and different schools of moral Realism and anti- Realism and their differences. Finally by reviewing Kant's most important moral teachings, we will show that based on different meanings of Realism we can put Kant in realist or anti-realist thinkers.

By emphasis on cognitive aspect of moral Realism, this article surveys various divisions in moral Realism and anti-Realism and, regarding later Wittgenstein's courses, it explores his views about this matter. Thus, after a short description of Wittgenstein’s courses in Philosophical Investigations which are related to this topic, ideas of his commentators in this area are studied. Since moral Realism has a firm relation with cognitive and non-cognitive discussion in meta-moral, thus later Wittgenstein’s view about this topic is also investigated. At the end, it is shown that calling Wittgenstein a realist or anti-realist is due to the wrong usage of reality grammar and he cannot be categorized as such.

The realization of knowledge in the form of naïve Realism and critical Realism has been one of main concerns of philosophers. Correspondence theory, which is considered as theory of truth in transcendental philosophy (Al Hekmah al-mota'aliya), can be interpreted as either naïve Realism or critical Realism. Problems of transcendental philosophy are presented in a way that evidence can be provided for both interpretations. Given the incompatibility of the two interpretations, only one should be chosen as Mulla Sadra's final theory. Given that within the framework of transcendental philosophy Naïve Realism faces many serious criticism and problems, and that Mulla Sadra's final theories and strong evidence provided by transcendental philosophy are more consistent with critical Realism, it seems that it is more appropriate to consider critical Realism as Mulla Sadra's final theory.

By appealing to the no-miracle argument (NM), scientific realists claim that the approximate truth of scientific theories and the existence of their postulated entities are the cause of the predictive and explanatory success of science. Antirealists, however, by appealing to the pessimistic meta-induction argument (PMI), claim that a lot of past predictively successful and yet false theories show that there is not any relationship between success of a theory and its truth. One of the most influential responses of realists to PMI is Structural Realism, proposed by John Worral. The aim of this thesis is to show that during theory-shift there has been a continuity at the structural or formal level, and the central terms of successive theories refer to the same entities (structures). In the first part of this paper NM and PMI will be explained. Then, a critical evaluation of structural Realism is given in both epistemological and ontological versions. It will be shown that this thesis is unable to rebut PMI conclusively. The conclusion of this paper, however, is that PMI cannot work against structural realists’ thesis if they limit the domain of their claim to existential sentences of scientific theories, to what I call “Existential Realism.”

In this paper, I am going to give an argument in favour of the atomistic and generalistic account in the realm of morality, according to which the behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different cases is answerable to general patterns. It follows from this that the particularistic account with regard the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature is implausible. Unlike generalists, particularists subscribe to holism, according to which the way in which a morally relevant feature contributes to the overall outcome of different cases is fully context-dependent. In order to criticize the particularistic view, firstly, it needs to be explained that in what sense the particularist and his rival, the generalist are realist. Moreover, by borrowing some notions from the philosophy of science, I show that Realism requires atomism, both in science and morality. It follows from this that the particularistic account which is associated with the realistic account is implausible

Carnap's semantical approach and development of his line of thoughts about Realismr is described. Carnap, in his last move by Ramsey-sentence approach, took a neutralized position. I compare Carnap's so called neutralism, as his final position, and Russell's structural Realism, then examine his development of views and finally show that his alleged neutralism is inconclusive, and trivial.