In this paper, I am going to present an argument in favour of the generalistic and atomistic position and criticize the particularistic and holistic view with regard to the way in which different morally relevant features are combined together in different contexts. According to the argument, the holist (particularist) is confronted with a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma concerns the problem with the idea of the contribution a morally relevant feature makes to moral evaluation. The second horn of the dilemma deals with the point that the holist’s metaphysical account with regard to the way in which different morally relevant features are combined together is vague. Having seen the dilemma, I am inclined to conclude that the particularist's argument with regard to the way in which different morally relevant features are combined together in different contexts is implausible.

The discussion on the reality of matter is one of the important discussions in philosophy, on which many views have been presented. One of the most important views with a longstanding background is the Atomism school attributed to the Greek philosopher, Democritus. In this view, the matter is composed of thousands of tiny separate particles which get together to make bigger bodies. These tiny particles, though capable of being divided in illusion or by reason, are not able to be divided in external world. This view is opposite to the views of most Muslim philosophers who consider the matter not composed of separate particles, but a substance composed of the prime matter and the physical form. They consider it something extended and essentially connected that can be divided anyway endlessly. Since many of the arguments for proving the prime matter depend on the nullification of Democritus’ theory and proving the separated divisibility in matters, Muslim philosophers have presented various arguments against that theory. In the present article, we have investigated and reviewed five arguments among the abovementioned arguments, finally considering all of them as falsified.

At the surface, Atomism, which is commonly widespread nowadays, is similar to the theory of indivisible particles and the proof of prime matter depends on denial of the indivisible particle. The present paper provides answers to the following questions: Did the proof for disproving the particles refute Atomism.....

The history of Atomism has begun from Ancient Greek. Greek Atomism was materialist, causal, and Mechanical. Atomism whether the ancient Atomism or modern version (after the seventeenth century), is regarded as a materialist theory. In medieval time, in the Islamic world, an atomistic theory was offered to explain nature by mū tikallimū n, (Muʿ tazila and Aš ʿ arī ). Opposite of Greek atomists, Muslim atomists were theists and they were called mū tikallimū n for begin devoted to Islam and Quran. Nonetheless, they have developed a theory that is similar in some aspects to the other atomistic theories; however, they were radical about God’ s omnipotence. In this paper, I investigate the metaphysical structure of Kalā m Atomism in the respect that they are based on which belief, after a brief introduction. And then I analyze that those theist theorists developed a scientific account in physics, which protected their religious beliefs. I examine how the theory results in materialism and the exclusion of metaphysics, but not entailing atheism.

In ancient times, atomists believed that objects were composed of minuscule, invisible, and indivisible particles known as "atoms" into which any substance could be broken down. Aristotle, on the other hand, rejected the physical breakdown of matter and advocated for a metaphysical analysis of matter and form. The majority of philosophers aligned with Aristotle's viewpoint. However, modern physics, relying on observation-based research, tends to lean towards Atomism.This paper aims to assess the solution proposed by Allameh Tabatabaei to reconcile the conflict between these two theories and determine which perspective should be favored when faced with irreconcilable differences. The study utilizes conceptual, propositional, and systemic analysis methods to address these issues.It becomes apparent that Tabatabaei's solution undermines and renders the theory of "form" ineffective. According to Aristotle, form constitutes the complete reality of a species. This implies that form cannot be reduced to the atomic level, as a single atom cannot represent the entirety of a body's reality and the foundation of its species. For instance, one atom of a "human" does not encompass the entire essence of a human being.

Atomism, originated from early Greek philosophers studies on nature, owes its philosophical full form to Leucippus and Democritus. On this view. there are indivisible bodies, of perpetual movement and infinite both in number and variety of their shapes, of which everything else is composed. Fundamental particles in a definite sensible body are separated from one another by void and their association, their dissociation and their rearrangement leads respectively to coming- to -be, passing -away and alteration. Fkhr aI-Din al-Razi, in spite of his contradictory saying, has finally agreed with the existence of invisible substantial particles, like physical points, and void in sensible bodies. For him, these point-like substances are of no shape and dimension and their number in a certain sensible body is, contrary to what is said in Atomism, finite. In this view, dimension is known to be due to the association of fundamental particles. This paper does not agree with Atomism when it says that an infinite number of dimensional particles are found in a certain sensible body and neither does with al-Razi when he says that the dimensions observed in a certian sensible body are due to association and that the number of those point-like particles in every sensible body is infinite. Now during the last three centuries experimental sciences have been greatly developed and in this way quantum physics has occurred, a kind of study which proves no shape and dimension for fundamentals. Al-Razis view has been, therefore, strengthened and mathematical explanation has been preferred to geometrical one.

Avicenna and Rhazes are two significant initiative physicians in the golden age of the Islamic period. Although both are raised from the Galenic tradition, we see the controversy and their different methods. Generally, it is said that Rhazes valued experiences, while Avicenna rather more theoretical approaches. Nonetheless, both physicians likewise their pioneer, Galen, were also philosophers. In this paper, I aim to clarify that their contrasting views are due to their different natural philosophy. In this paper, I investigate the basis of their ideas in natural philosophy, according to the existent sources (i. e. their books and treatises), in an analytical approach. And then, in their medical texts, I examine the hypothesis derived from their natural philosophy books. As Rhazes was an atomist in natural philosophy, this view rejects determinism and essentialism in Physics. As a result of this approach, the analysis of questions of nature turned less to metaphysics and more to empiricism. This view contrasts with Avicenna, who believed in Continuism and Hylomorphism and consequently he had an essentialist and teleologist view of nature. These led him to metaphysical analysis in the exploration of natural phenomena. I show that their different methods of writing medical books originate from their different natural philosophies and views on the principles of nature.

Putnam's 1960 article, "Minds and Machines", sketched a novel approach to the mind based on the analogy between mental states and logical-computational state of Turing machine, which later acknowledged as functionalism. Based on his interpretation of the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Dreyfus criticized Putnam’s functionalist-computation a list approach to the mind in an article directly addressing to him. In both physical and psychological-phenomenological level, Dreyfus proposes that mind can’t be understood as Turing machine which works with formal rules and in which inputs and outputs are context-free and independent of environment. About three decades after his article "minds and machines", according to Carnap’s failure to formulate induction and Quine’s holism and also based on his semantic externalism, Putnam rejected his functionalist-computation a list approach and accepted an externalist-contextualist approach. Although Putnam does not mention the name of Dreyfus, his criticism to reject functionalism was obviously resembling the one Dreyfus stated previously contrary to the functionalism. In this paper, in order to reconstruct the critical dialogue between Dreyfus and Putnam, first, functionalism is formulated in the works of Putnam. After that, the phenomenological critique of Dreyfus to Putnam is stated. Then, it is shown that the causes of Putnam’s turning from functionalism to contextual point of view were thoroughly similar to Dreyfus’s critics to him. Last, it is shown that based on this turning from functionalism to contextualism, physicalism as a theory of mind is challenged and instead “subject in the world” provides a better model of the mind.

Today the plurality of theories of revolution is such that the categorization and understanding of these theories has become a kind of scientific work. A conventional and common classification of revolution theories, which is rooted in sociological theories, is structural-cultural duality or structure-agent 8. In this category, revolution theories either explain the revolution with a structural approach or with a cultural and agent approach. There have been extensive discussions around this duality and its validity. This text puts the cultural and structural investigation of the revolution in close connection with the two propositions: revolutions come and revolutions are made, and through establishing this connection to determine the position of each of the two cultural and structural approaches and then redefine the position of the two The said proposition pays. In other words, he seeks to gain a clearer understanding of such a relationship by intentionally establishing it as a method.

One of important critiques, communtarian to liberal Philosophy was in ontologic dimension upon concept of the Individual. They claims that sense “the Self” is part of Community, On Other hands, With highlight on essense Social of the Self, offers social picture of that. Because They belives that the Self has shaped in historical and social context, so far as ends, values, convictions resulting from the community. By Contrast, liberal philosophy in general and The Theory of justice of John Rawls in particular has emphasize on the picture of Individual and a priori Individualized. Hence, present essay attempet to evaluate only Ontological dimension in the thought of Communitarians, with supposing that output the claim within sphere political ontology, is merely alternative for that and its essence nothing that situated and social constructed Self.