falsifiability was one of the influential theories in the field of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century. However, its success is mostly due to its negative role, namely, in criticizing the opponents. The author in this article reviews Popper’s critiques of such theories as positivism and determinism, while reflecting on the consequences of rejecting Darwin’s hypothesis of evolution as scientific. At the end, the article concludes that falsifiability enjoys no acceptable success on the positive side, and is unable to correctly explain the role of observation in science and its relation to theory.

Modern (theoretical) physics seems to be in deep crisis today as many of its core aspects are not empirically well-confirmed. Heated exchanges among physicists on the scientific status of physical theories with little or, at best, a tenuous connection to possible experimental tests is highly visible in the popular scientific literature. Some physicists (e.g., Carroll 2014, 2019; Ijjas et al., 2017) argue that science must discard empirical testability as one of its defining properties and the highly explanatory theories of present-day physics should be exempted from experimental testing, while others (e.g., Ellis & Silk 2014) spot in these arguments (for softening the testability or falsifiability requirement for modern physics) a dangerous tendency to undermine science. The philosopher of science who naturally draws most attention in these current debates is Karl Popper (1902-1994). His views, however, are often misrepresented in these debates. The prime objective of this paper is to explain how a more enlightened perspective on the ongoing debates can be obtained by a careful scrutiny of the Popperian criterion of falsifiability. As a first step in achieving this objective we will analyze the two major (conceptual) failures on which the current controversies rest. Our next step will be examining the controversial string theory to see whether the criteria of falsifiability is a ‘blunt instrument’ for determining its scientific status.

The interpretation and application of the Qur'an with the help of experimental sciences has always been popular among the early and late scholars of the Qur'an and has brought positive achievements. The theory of falsity in Popper's critical realism, as one of the influential views in the field of modern philosophy of science, has always been criticized by some Western and Muslim philosophers. The main question of the present article, which has been written in a fundamental, descriptive, analytical and experimental way, is what are the most basic actions of Popper's theory of falsity on scientific interpretation from the perspective of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. The result of the present study is the five cases of opposition of the above theory to the "principles" of scientific interpretation of the Qur'an. Such as the meaninglessness of metaphysics, the opposition of infinite conjectures and falsifications that do not reach the final truth to the infallibility of the concepts of the Qur'an, etc., And the five instances of incompatibility of this theory with the "rules" of scientific interpretation of the Qur'an, such as not accepting the scientificity of partial and possible empirical propositions from the perspective of the theory of falsity and its validity in the Holy Qur'an, etc.

Background and Purpose: Nowadays since Traditional Medicine has received a remarkable amount of public notice in Iran, many scattered controversies have occurred about scientificity of Traditional Medicine. In order to analyze this question rationally it is necessary to determine the criteria of scientificity exactly and based on the most important philosophical theories at first. In this domain there have been three important theories which consist of Inductivism, having paradigm and falsificationism. So far two articles have been published by the author in which scientificity of Traditional Medicine have been analyzed based on inductivism and having Paradigm. Now in this article the third criterion i.e. falsifiability and its existence in Traditional Medicine is going to be analyzed philosophically in order to prove that Traditional Medicine has all of the most important criteria in the philosophy of science of 20th century. Falsifibility is one of the most important and influential theories about scientificity in the 20th century. This theory is produced by Karl Popper which at first criticizes the inductivists' point of view and offers Falsificationism instead. This article is introducing and analyzing this theory and the concept of falsifiability at first and is showing that the Iranian Traditional Medicine is falsifiable and therefore is science from this point of view.Methods and Materials: This article is going to introduce exactly the falsifiability based on the most famous books written by Karl Popper; then shows that the Iranian Traditional Medicine's system is falsifiable and therefore is science. The research is Library- based.Results: The Iranian Traditional Medicine is science based on Falsificationists' criterion.

Scientific theories are a way of knowing man. The main difference between this method and other methods is the testability of its claims. Testability helps to correct scientific knowledge of error. In economics, this knowledge is created by using econometric methods and models. Assumptions Econometric models are called auxiliary assumptions. Two fundamental problems in econometrics that challenge testability; ignoring auxiliary assumptions and statistically significant. The Duhem (1904) stated that if the auxiliary assumptions are inconsistent with the reality falsity method will be questioned. In the present study, the Duhem problem in the EMH and financial data structure has been investigated. In another section, the use and interpretation of statistical significance is studied, which is usually evaluated with an index called p < /em>-value. While the p < /em>-value can be a good statistical metric, it is often misused and misinterpreted. As a result, some reputable scientific journals have banned the use of p < /em>-values. To make good use of this criterion in the econometric methodology, the recommendations of the American Statistical Association in this field have been discussed. In order to deal with the role of auxiliary assumptions, it is necessary to specify tests and pay attention to the data structure.

IntroductionIn this paper we try to explain epistemological problems of social sciences in Iran. We first distinguish between epistemological problems and non-epistemological problems. The theoretical context of research includes ideas from Habermas and Popper as they have interesting and very significant theories in this respect. When it comes to Habermas, we put emphasis on various elements of his work. For example, he has important ideas about philosophy of social sciences, including critique of dominant approaches in the social sciences such as positivism, hermeneutics, scientism, and so on.

The present article examines the evolution and transformation of approaches and methodological perspectives of the early centuries of modernism to the fundamental change in the philosophical perspectives of Western thought in the form of postmodern views in the field of political thought. Analysis and evaluation will do. In this regard, on the one hand, the transformation of raw empiricism and its transition to positivism, logical positivism, and the transition from positivism to falsification will be evaluated. On the other hand, the emergence of a transformation in positivist and fanatical componentistic attitudes and its shifting to macroeconomic attitudes and structures will be considered in the framework of the study of Imar Lakatos and the Thomas Cohen paradigm. Finally, the Feyerabend anarchist approach will be considered. And finally, an overview of how postmodern approaches are developed, which is a product of rotation and a fundamental change in the philosophical and sociological attitudes of the West. Of course, attempts to avoid entering into the details of these perspectives should be avoided as far as possible, since the central focus of this paper is to analyze the evolution of methodological perspectives from "science" (philosophy of science) to postmodernism.

Throughout the years, philosophers and psychologists have striven to solve the mindboggling question of learning by juxtaposing the two competing theories, namely, empiricism and rationalism. They have usually opted for one and ruled out the other on the grounds that it cannot account for learning because theoretical and empirical evidence discredits it. Since 1965, with the publication of Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax in which, he explicitly introduces the notion of Universal Grammar and implicitly employs the term to support Fodor's philosophical view of learning in terms of 'language of thought', the rationalistic arguments seem to have taken over this never-ending and perpetual battle. Here in this article, it is argued that despite its popularity among a good number of scholars, the rationalistic account of learning suffers from serious flaws. A conglomerate of empirical and theoretical evidence challenges the notion of 'language of thought'. Self-interpretive power of the language of thought, inaccessibility of cognitive theories to truth conditional meaning, meaningful experiences, inability to test memory, problems with modularity and regulation are simply some of the arguments that might be raised against the idea of 'language of thought'. Finally, a framework for the acquisition of language is presented.

In the present article, the authors aim to study Karl Raymond Popper's theory of democracy and evaluate its philosophical and epistemological foundations. The importance of this discussion lies in showing the logical relation of and consistency between Popper's scientific-philosopher principles and doctrines inferred from them on the one hand and his model of democracy on the other. Thus, the authors try, employing a descriptive-analytic methodology, to describe and explain foundations and goals of democracy and its distinct theoretical components on the basis of Popper's theoretical suppositions. Finding of the present study show that Popper has ingeniously based his political epistemological understandings on his own scientific and philosophical principles, and extended their contents to cover democracy.

The purpose of writing this article is to test two prominent hypotheses about Rostam al-Tawarikh by the method of falsifiability. Rustam Alhokma is one of the historians that so far, there have been Paradoxical judgments about his personality and Type of historiography; As some historians have considered his works, especially Rostam al-Tawarikh, as an example of "illusion" and "delusion", On the contrary, a number of political scientists have included him a thinker that Some of the basic ideas in the future Constitutional Revolution such as "secularization" and "care for the masses " was placed in his works. The author has tried to test the above contradictory hypotheses by using the method of falsifiability and evaluating their scientificity from the perspective of this method. The author has made it clear that the first hypothesis is formulated by the inductive method and is valid within the framework of this method, but from the point of view of a historical refutation, it is a "falsifiable" hypothesis. However, due to the anachronistic nature and lack of propositions that support that hypothesis, the second hypothesis is irrefutable from the point of view of the Popper method and therefore unscientific.