Today, the rapid growth of dependence of human life on the cyberspace has raised the attention of the enemies of every society to the threats in this space. Several cyberATTACKs that have taken place in countries such as Estonia, Georgia and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the past, warn that the future of cyberspace will not be free of threats and ATTACKs. Deterrence has always been a very important issue for all countries. In this practical and developmental research, we present Strategical Deterrence model in cyberspace. The game theory will help us model and analyze the deterrent model and descriptive and mathematical inferences will be used to analyze the model. Finally, in this paper, a strategical model for deterrence in cyberspace will be presented in four stages: the current, optimal, gap analysis and warning stages based on the signaling game with incomplete information. Finally after describing each components of the model and their relationship with each other, it has been shown that the amount of equilibrium can indicate the status of the players in the three situation of conflict, balance and mutual weakness, and only in two situation of balance and mutual weakness, the deterrence will exist.