Objective: The Game Theory attempts to model math behavior in a strategic situation. This situation occurs when the success of one side of the Game depends on the strategies that the other party chooses. The purpose of this study is to find an optimal strategy for the interests of the parties in the Game using the Game Theory approach. Methods: The present study uses managers and auditors to maximize their profits, respectively, from profit management strategies and increasing the quality of the audit (reducing the risk of uncritical discovery). The statistical population of the study is a statistical society that is accessible to all companies admitted to the stock market by imposing restrictions on the years 1391 to 1395. Hypotheses for the combined data of 116 companies (575 companies of the year) were tested using the best responder response and the Mann-Whitney test. Results: Research findings reveal the existence of “ Nash equilibrium” in the strategy of high audit quality strategy and high earning management, therefore in this strategy, neither the auditor nor the manager has the incentive to change the strategy because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy, Because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy. Conclusion: The results of the research indicate that it is important to consider the audit as a type of strategic environment. The findings of this research can help auditors in analyzing conflicts with the client and selecting the optimal strategy in the audit process.

In the explosive growth of Business to Business (B2B) Electronic Trades, electronic markets have received a great deal of attention recently. The obtained profit of trading in E-B2B market encourage market participants to remain in the market. Market participants consist of: sellers, buyers, and market owner. In this paper the expected profit function for each market participant has been defined in a neutral market based on double auction. Also, the model is simulated and results are shown. Linear programming in Game matrix is used to exhibit the capability of the proposed model to support the decision making process. Then the model is exemplified.

A Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) as a comprehensive model for efficient and equitable allocation of water in a river basin is designed. This model comprised of two steps: first the initial allocation of water using Lexicographic Minimax Ratio of Water Shortage (LMWSR), and second, water reallocation and net benefit for an efficient and optimal allocation of water transfer model. The second step can usethe followings: Irrigation Water Planning Model (IWPM); Hydrologic-Economic River Basin Model (HERBM) and Cooperative Reallocation Game (CRG).This study is performed in order to optimize the allocation of water resources of Chahnimeh natural reservoirs in a 12 month term (April 2005 to March 2006) using Game Theory.The results of LMWSR model showed a satisfaction ratio of 1 to 0.89 for domestic water and 1 to 0.49 for agricultural sector. For allocating water to the reservoirs this ratio is less than 1 for all months.The HERBM model results showed that the total allocation and profit of domestic water is increased in the optimal allocation compared to the initial allocation. These are decreased for agricultural compared to the initial allocation.The reallocation of benefits based on the concept of Shaply value showed that the maximum benefit obtained for the domestic water of Zahedan City which drew the maximum side payment and added value from other stakeholders in the whole period. The least benefit belongs to the agricultural sector.

In this paper, a new Game theoretic-based approach is proposed for multi-response optimization problem. Game Theory is a useful tool for decision making in the conflict of interests between intelligent players in order to select the best joint strategy for them through selecting the best joint desirability. Present research uses the Game Theory approach via definition of each response as each player and factors as strategies of each player. This approach can determine the best predictor factor sets in order to obtain the best joint desirability of responses. For this aim, the signal to noise ratio (SN) index for each response have been calculated with considering the joint values of strategies; then obtained SN ratios for each strategy is modeled in the Game Theory table. Finally, using Nash Equilibrium, the best strategy which is the best values of predictor factors is determined. A real case and a numerical example are given to show the efficiency of the proposed method. In addition, the performance of the proposed method is compared with the VIKOR method.

The open access to the transmission system and the methods of transmission cost alloca-tion are the key points that allow free competition in deregulated electric markets. All existing allocation methods have advantages and disadvantages that depend on the char-acteristics of the power system and the price structure of the market. The comparison of the cost allocation methods has been the aim of many studies in order to improve them.Under the deregulated environment, the cost needs to be allocated to the loads as well as generators fairly and unbiased so as to provide a locational signal to both types of players for optimal setting. This paper proposes Game theoretic models based on the Shapley value approaches for transmission cost allocation problems under the deregulated environment.The obtained results are compared with those from the usually adopted methodologies to defend easy implementation and effectiveness of the proposed methodologies.

Production costs in general, and workforce and inventory costs in particular, constitute a large fraction of the operating costs of many manufacturing plants. We introduce cooperative aggregate production planning as a way to decrease these costs. That is, when production planning of two or more facilities (plants) is integrated, they can interchange workforce and products inventory; thus, their product demands can be satisfied at lower cost. This paper quantifies the cost saving and synergy of different coalitions of production plants by a new linear model for cooperative aggregate planning problem. The developed approach is explicated with a numerical example in which inventory and workforce levels of different coalitions of facilities are evaluated. Afterward, a key question would be how the cost saving of a coalition should be divided among members. We tackle the problem using different methods of cooperative Game Theory. These methods are implemented in the numerical example to gain an insight into properties of the corresponding Game results.

In the holy sharia of Islam, there are rules and regulations for all kinds of transactions. Some of transactions are forbidden. The rule of denial of Gharar is one of these forbidden transactions. According to this rule, all transactions, which face with risk resulting from ambiguity in the deal, ambiguity in ability to give or receive goods or ambiguity in the essential characteristics of the deal, in such a way these terminate to loss are forbidden.In this paper, the rule of denial of Gharar as one of main economic rules of Islam is examined using Game Theory technique. The main purpose of this paper is to show the futility reasons of Gharar deals in Islam. In this regard, a hypothetical Gharar transaction is modeled in the framework of Game with asymmetric information, and its consequences for the society are investigated. The results show that disregarding this valuable Islamic rule imposes extra costs on society and decreases the social utility. It is demonstrated that if the problem of asymmetric information is resolved, the possibility of Gharar transactions will be reduced and the welfare of the society will be enhanced.