The debate of WILL and volition has always been an important part of the intellectual and philosophical discourse as a whole. The current essay has studied this issue from the points of view of Ghazali and Spinoza in a comparative context. Spinoza has conceived WILL to be a type of notion while Ghazali considers it a mental quality that deals with preferring one side to the other. It seems that the reason for the disagreement of these two scholars in definition of WILL lies in the fact that Ghazali believes that WILL is one aspect of heart and soul whereas Spinoza includes it among the capabilities of mind. First he regarded WILL as a type of judgment but later due to the fact that judgment is the necessary result of notion he was compelled to consider it a kind of notion. Furthermore, according to Spinoza, an action is volition when it becomes realized out of its nature in the sense that no other internal or external stimulus forces the agent to undertake the action at issue; while Ghazali contends that the criterion for an action’s volitionality (the state of being volitional) is it’s being grounded in WILL.....

In this article, article I intend to consider the explanation of the WILL and the ability of this explanation to answer the difficulties concerning this issue in Aquinas philosophy. He believed that the soul is a substance and its powers are described as accidents for it, namely they don't follow necessarily from the soul's nature. Aquinas accepted Aristotle's idea about the appetitive power as a distinct power of the soul. In this Philosophical system intellectual appetite is distinguished from sensitive appetite, The former is depending on understanding and the latter is related to sensation. The intellectual appetite is named WILL. On the other hand Aquinas believed in FREE WILL Whose specific sign is choice. Therefore we ought to accept that the WILL is affected not only by intellect but also by sensation, and Aquinas believed it too. But if one describes the WILL as a intellectual appetite he WILL not be able to believe in the FREE WILL.

In each one of the well-known Abrahamic religions, notably Islam, Christianity and Judaism, there are two important doctrines which seem to be inconsistent, but nonetheless some religious philosophers like Plantinga try to show that there is no conflict between them. The first doctrine is that God is Omniscient and He has foreknowledge of all that WILL happen in the future and thus all human actions are determined in His knowledge. The second doctrine is that human beings have FREE WILL and they are responsible for all of their voluntary actions. The problem is that if all future actions of a person are determined in divine knowledge, it is impossible for him to change his future and so he is not FREE. This article WILL assess some of the solutions given to the problem and it WILL focus on Plantinga's solution to the problem and then it WILL unravel some defects of his solution. At the end of this article, a new solution to the problem WILL be given, in which the FREE WILL of human being is confirmed while the nature of divine knowledge is regarded ambiguous to the extent that its changeability or unchangeability is left unknown.

The question of determinism or FREE WILL has been a challenging problem in theology. Shi'i and Mu'tazili theologians defend FREE WILL and Asha'ri's defend determinism and sometimes give a theory named Kasb (acquirement) in this relation. Fakhre Razi is a great Ash'ari theologian. But he attemts to avoid pure determinism. In this paper we show how he tries to combine human power and FREEdom with determination that originates from divine omnipower. We WILL discuss that sometime he moves from Kasb theory to the theory of amrun bayn al-amrayn (a thing between determinism and FREE WILL), which is a characteristic of shi'i theology. But he cannot explain this theory. So he remains on the dilmma of determinism and FREE WILL and cannot give a clear explanation in this relation.

This article studies one of the two current conceptions of FREE WILL i. e negative conception or the definition of FREE WILL to having alternative possibilities; and tries to assess and ascertain the validity of this historically popular conception, by exhausting all possible approvals and also its disapprovals. The investigations indicate that the disagreement on this issue causes philosophers to revolt against one another in the debate of FREE between the two camps of Compatibilist and incompatibilist. The dispute of these two groups begins with debating on the relation between negative FREE WILL and Determinism, and continues with the possibility of FREE WILL in a determined world and finally reaches its peak by posing two fundamental objections against each other: The harm-mind hypothesis of Determinism on side of Incompatibilists and Intelligibility challenge on side of Compatibilists. And thus confirming or rejecting of such conception at last depends on assessing these two objections. I conclude our assessment by rejecting the negative conception.

According to a common view among Muslim philosophers, a moral agent has FREE WILL if and only if she is able to do an action when she wants to and is able to avoid it when she wants otherwise. Implicit in this view is the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). On the other hand, according to this view, FREE WILL is dependent on requirements such as conception, judgement, tendency, decision, and personal volition. In this paper, I discuss the bilateral defects of this view and present a reformed view on FREE WILL and moral responsibility in relation to causal predetermination in an Islamic context.

Many studies have been performed on the problem of determinism and FREE WILL and also on Mowlavi`s view on it. Yet, few have studied the agents affecting the limit of FREE WILL in Mowlvi`s view. In this paper, it has been sought to give a clear description on the agents. The pen has relied on a story of the first book in Mathnavi speaking of a Jewish king who killed Christians. It is intended in the paper, to attract the addressed readers`s attention on the limit of FREE WILL, the agents affecting the limit of FREE WILL and the way in which they affect it and to refer to Mowlavi`s recommendations for avoiding the agents limiting the scope of FREE WILL. Such being the case, a full example of expanded FREE WILL has been introduced.

With no doubt, the element by which we are permitted to admire or blame one for his good or bad actions is FREEdom. But what the essence of FREEdom is and how human being can get it, in a world governed by causal determinism, are two questions which most moral philosophers in west have discussed. In this regard some of them believe that compatibility between FREEdom and causal determinism is impossible, so they have denied one of them in the favor of the other and have established incompatibilism. In contrary, some others, from modern era up now, have tried to make them compatible, in order to revival moral responsibility and prevent from falling in randomness. This view has been called compatibilism. This article studies compatibilism from the viewpoints of philosophers’ such as Hobbes, Hume, Ayer, Frankfurt, Watson, Wolf and Fischer. Finally this paper it cleared that despite the rightness of compatibilism, because of their unsuccessfulness in proposing a true explanation of human FREEdom and moral responsibility, compatibilists have failed to show that this view is reasonable and justified.

This paper has intended to find out if FREE WILL is in agreement with the principle of causality and determinism. At first, the nature of FREE WILL and necessity has been explained. Then, the objections against the agreement have been critically examined. At last, a comparison has been made between the teachings of classic and quantum physics on determinism in one hand, and necessity and FREE WILL on the other.

The intuition that humans has about FREE WILL, has always been a solid backbone against the overwhelming challenges of FREE WILL. In Islamic philosophy, this intuition has been represented in the form of presential knowledge and has been considered as an undoubted knowledge. In this paper, we we have discussed the phenomenology of FREE WILL by using the principles of transcendent wisdom by analytical proof method, in the sense that we have examined our intuition about FREE WILL and identified its epistemic value. The phenomenological analysis of FREE WILL has led us to conclude that the intuition of FREE WILL is an interconnected set of ten perceptional components. These components are not identical in terms of epistemological validity and are categorized into three different groups. Some of them are highly visible in the form of presential knowledge or propositions that are directly derived from this particular knowledge (inner experience propositions or VIJDANIAT). This group is absolutely epistemologically valid without any condition. The other group is not highly visible in the form of presential knowledge and requires some evidence to be complete and credible. The third group consists of components that have different degrees, each level has a different epistemological validity than the others. In the intuition of FREE WILL, components that are not epistemologically credible provide the context in which, with a common intuition, different interpretations of FREE WILL can be presented.