CONTEXTUALISM is the main opponent of minimalism. The debate between these two semantical approaches, stem in an old fashion dispute to determine the border between semantics and pragmatics. Contextualists claim that the sentences in the natural language are not truth-evaluable before being enriched pragmatically. In contrast, in minimalists’ viewpoint, there is a minimal semantic content that provides the truth-evaluable meaning of sentences in a way that context of utterance has limited effects on it. This contrast is based on the way and extent to which context affects semantic content. In this paper, after introducing these two approaches, the main arguments of contextualists against minimalist are discussed, then we show that minimalistic semantics like Kaplan's LD with objective interpretation of context cannot present any proper model even for sentences containing first-person reference, and on the basis of a subjective interpretation of context, the indexical/non-indexical distinction is not clear and other expressions of natural languages can be indexical, in a broad sense.

Epistemic CONTEXTUALISM is a view in epistemology that the semantic contents of knowledge-attributing sentences vary relative to the contexts of knowledge attributers. Traditionally, epistemologists regard the semantic content of knowledge sentences as invariable across contexts. This traditional prevailing view is famous to "invariantism". According to Subjective sensitive invariantism (SSI), the truth conditions of knowledge attributers are constant in different contexts, but truth values of them vary relative to the contexts of knowledge attributers. Recently, Stephen Shaffer, a proponent of epistemic CONTEXTUALISM, has criticized SSI. In this article, after defending of SSI in contrast of Shaffer’s arguments, I argue his arguments are unsound.

Epistemic CONTEXTUALISM is a recent view in epistemology that has evolved primarily as a response to skepticism. Epistemic CONTEXTUALISM is a semantic thesis and is the view that the truth conditions for knowledge attributions, sentences of the form “S knows that P” and “S doesn’t know that P”, can vary across contexts as a result of shifting epistemic standards. This view, in fact, is a linguistic turn in epistemology. Contextualist seeks to explained epistemological problems by semantics of knowledge sentences. In this paper I will examine one of the semantics foundations of CONTEXTUALISM, that is epistemic standard as a unarticulated constituent, and will show that their epistemic claim is controversial and unpleasant.

The beginning of any creative design event has always been accompanied by questions in the designer's mind; Because this ups and downs and full of ambiguity, which includes different stages and activities, leads the designer to multiple answers, each of which includes obvious and hidden angles of the subject. In this sense, the design process in each of the topics and stages is fraught with challenges. But what is particularly important in this direction is the starting point of the design and the ideation stage, which results in the formation of the primary generator as the idea and the coherence of the design. In this regard, taking advantage of the effects of the context and design context can be considered as a very important and influential starting point in the architectural design process. However, the effects of the design context and context can be considered as a very important and influential starting point in the architectural design process. In view of the above, the present study was conducted with the aim of explaining and analyzing the CONTEXTUALISM indicators in the design process. Using in-depth interviews with experts in the field of architecture and urban planning, including university professors and professional architects, the characteristics of CONTEXTUALISM extracted from the studies of the first step of research in the design process were analyzed; Finally, the results indicate the impact of physical, spatial and material qualities as well as human, social and cultural dimensions of the existing context. However, the influence of other characteristics of the field in this important can not be denied.

Putnam's 1960 article, "Minds and Machines", sketched a novel approach to the mind based on the analogy between mental states and logical-computational state of Turing machine, which later acknowledged as functionalism. Based on his interpretation of the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Dreyfus criticized Putnam’s functionalist-computation a list approach to the mind in an article directly addressing to him. In both physical and psychological-phenomenological level, Dreyfus proposes that mind can’t be understood as Turing machine which works with formal rules and in which inputs and outputs are context-free and independent of environment. About three decades after his article "minds and machines", according to Carnap’s failure to formulate induction and Quine’s holism and also based on his semantic externalism, Putnam rejected his functionalist-computation a list approach and accepted an externalist-contextualist approach. Although Putnam does not mention the name of Dreyfus, his criticism to reject functionalism was obviously resembling the one Dreyfus stated previously contrary to the functionalism. In this paper, in order to reconstruct the critical dialogue between Dreyfus and Putnam, first, functionalism is formulated in the works of Putnam. After that, the phenomenological critique of Dreyfus to Putnam is stated. Then, it is shown that the causes of Putnam’s turning from functionalism to contextual point of view were thoroughly similar to Dreyfus’s critics to him. Last, it is shown that based on this turning from functionalism to CONTEXTUALISM, physicalism as a theory of mind is challenged and instead “subject in the world” provides a better model of the mind.

As the claim of knowledge without presenting the sufficient ground or evidence is unjustified, the basis of contemporary epistemology is what the foundation of the system of human knowledge is and that from where this system originates and where it ends. According to later Wittgenstein, the description of the word without a number of basic and certain propositions is impossible. Although their certainty does not mean their correspondence with the fact, it relies upon the attitude of the individuals. What is certain and evident for us is determined by a language game in which one partakes. Therefore, the human knowledge in itself depends on his actions and characteristic behavioural patterns. Wittgenstein maintains that justification and rationality rest invariably on context and engage in social activities and language games. Since forms of life, world-pictures and world – views are different, there are various ways of rationality.In this article, elucidating the tripartite definition of knowledge, we have dealt with the analysis of knowledge and its distinctive aspect with certainty from wittgenstein’s view. Then, referring to the structure of epistemological foundations in wittgenstein’s thought, we have mentioned it, why according to him, foundationalism fails to defend the validity of epistemological system and with taking the theory of CONTEXTUALISM, what difference will take place in the foundations of knowledge and the quality of the dependence of other sciences on them.Finally, studying the theory of CONTEXTUALISM and elucidating a number of its advantages, we have explained that this theory allows a version of relativism and is not without some kind of skeptical tendencies.