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مرکز اطلاعات علمی SID1
اسکوپوس
دانشگاه غیر انتفاعی مهر اروند
ریسرچگیت
strs
Author(s): 

LI K. | ZHAO X.

Journal: 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2008
  • Volume: 

    37
  • Issue: 

    4
  • Pages: 

    673-694
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    462
  • Views: 

    25338
  • Downloads: 

    29437
Keywords: 
Abstract: 

Yearly Impact:

View 25338

Download 29437 Citation 462 Refrence 0
Author(s): 

MORELAC E.

Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2011
  • Volume: 

    99
  • Issue: 

    -
  • Pages: 

    262-288
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    457
  • Views: 

    20161
  • Downloads: 

    28498
Keywords: 
Abstract: 

Yearly Impact:

View 20161

Download 28498 Citation 457 Refrence 0
Author(s): 

DESHMUKH S.

Journal: 

FINANCIAL REVIEW

Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2003
  • Volume: 

    38
  • Issue: 

    -
  • Pages: 

    351-368
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    469
  • Views: 

    29028
  • Downloads: 

    30797
Keywords: 
Abstract: 

Yearly Impact:

View 29028

Download 30797 Citation 469 Refrence 0
گارگاه ها آموزشی
Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2016
  • Volume: 

    8
  • Issue: 

    2 (16)
  • Pages: 

    199-226
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    0
  • Views: 

    725
  • Downloads: 

    350
Abstract: 

Transparency and ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION is one of the basic assumptions of competitive market, but in the real world person's INFORMATION are not symmetrical and equal and phenomenon of ASYMMETRICal INFORMATION is evident. However, sometimes ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION is as natural and artificial forms and the parties earn maximum profit by misusing additional INFORMATION with respect to the other party.In this article, phenomenon of ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION and ways to prevent it is investigated by using content analysis method and also by referring to the Koran verses and Islamic jurisprudence by using the knowledge of Islamic economics. The results show that according to the Koran verses and jurisprudential rules ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION is a subject which not only in muslim communities but also in non- Muslim communities is visible. But in Muslim societies due to the terms of trade in the contracts, abuse of this this phenomenon is relatively less. These terms including considering the Terms of the parties, contract issue, properly condition, as well as compliance with the religious, Isalamic moral governance, Guidance and supervision of government, remember of Allah and the fear of the resurrection day, concentrating on ethics in the market, authorizing the termination to swindle person, considering some jurisprudential rules (Prohibit from trading Gharar and pride and …). Islamic governing should more careful monitor the validity of the contract to prevent this phenomenon and abuse of it.

Yearly Impact:

View 725

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Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2015
  • Volume: 

    6
  • Issue: 

    21
  • Pages: 

    109-127
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    0
  • Views: 

    1254
  • Downloads: 

    444
Abstract: 

INFORMATION asymmetry leads to formation of inefficient INFORMATION. This inefficiency may affect firm’s performance. One of the main advantages of business groups is lowering the levels of INFORMATION asymmetry. This study aims at investigating the effect of INFORMATION asymmetry on performance in business group.To test the research hypothesis, 1395 year-companies from listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange in a 10 financial year from 1382 to 1391have been studied. The results indicated that there exists a negative relationship between INFORMATION asymmetry and the rate of return on assets (ROA) (firm performance). Also, the results showed that firms in business groups have higher ROA than independent firms. Additionally, the firms in variety business groups have higher ROA than the firms in the other business groups. The other findings indicated that the level of INFORMATION asymmetry in the firms affiliated with business groups is less than that in the independent firms. Also, the rate of INFORMATION asymmetry in the firms in variety business groups is lower than that in the firms affiliated with the other business groups.

Yearly Impact:

View 1254

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Author(s): 

ERFANI A.R.

Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2002
  • Volume: 

    3
  • Issue: 

    7-8
  • Pages: 

    0-0
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    0
  • Views: 

    1285
  • Downloads: 

    380
Keywords: 
Abstract: 

Often “Moral hazard” is quoted as an impact of insurance on insured. It has been observed that the households, which have fire insurance, have been subjected to more firing; or cars, which have theft insurance, are being stolen more. Such indications express the fact that people after getting insurance for their properties, pay less attention to their insured property. For this reason, the cost of insurance companies has been risen sharply. To solve this problem, insurance companies are thinking about measures such as coinsurance and deductible. However in order to optimize one insurance contract, symmetric and ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION is required. In the case of symmetric INFORMATION, insurance contract which maximizes insurance company’s profit is of “full insurance” and it has pareto efficiency. But in case of ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, the insurance company must provide “full insurance” with low-level effort by insured for maximizing profit. This insurance contract is optimal although it doesn’t have pareto efficiency.

Yearly Impact:

View 1285

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strs
Author(s): 

SADR S.K.

Journal: 

NAMEH-YE-MOFID

Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2005
  • Volume: 

    11
  • Issue: 

    1 (48 ECONOMICS)
  • Pages: 

    79-98
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    1
  • Views: 

    1028
  • Downloads: 

    132
Abstract: 

Islamic bankers use a combination of equity and non-equity financial instruments for financial investment purposes. Choice of an efficient portfolio of financial assets requires direct functional relationship between the supply of fund via each instrument with its rate of return and a negative relationship with its risk. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION hinders selection of efficient equity instruments, unless Islamic bankers monitor the implementation of contracts with their partners. Although monitoring is a costly operation for bankers it is at the same time an investment for obtaining new INFORMATION which will be used for the choice of efficient equity tools and their supervision. The performance of 24 regional supervisory units of Agricultural Bank all over the country during a five-year period of this study verifies this hypothesis. That is, the allocation of financial resources among equity and non equity instruments has been found to have a significant positive relationship with the rate of recovery and a negative relationship with the risk of selected instruments. It is, therefore, concluded that monitoring services of the bank is instrumental in the choice of an efficient selection of equity and non equity financial tools in Islamic banking.

Yearly Impact:

View 1028

Download 132 Citation 1 Refrence 1
Journal: 

Financial Economics

Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2017
  • Volume: 

    10
  • Issue: 

    37
  • Pages: 

    149-164
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    0
  • Views: 

    1254
  • Downloads: 

    289
Abstract: 

This paper pays to the effect of ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION in insurance markets contracts. Based on a sample survey consist of 2000 auto insurers in Tehran City , with using Morgan test, we select 300 insurers in automobile insurance which are chosen randomly. We designed a model which included insured age, driving experience, degree of education, automobile type and individual who have an accident or have not an accident performances in 2010. Via a Probit model estimation and risk functions of individuals and coordinating with Chiappori (2006), we tested ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION effect by using of STATA software.The findings show that, people who chose higher insurance coverage, do not have higher likelihood accident necessarily. Besides this, we found out that there is no significant correlation between ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION and degrees of risk in automobile insurance. However, we released that there is significant correlation between degrees of education and number of accidents.

Yearly Impact:

View 1254

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Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2012
  • Volume: 

    2
  • Issue: 

    4
  • Pages: 

    1-30
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    0
  • Views: 

    1862
  • Downloads: 

    446
Abstract: 

An accountant as an INFORMATION preparer is executive of INFORMATION revealing in which has establisher kind of compromise and credits and debits between relevant and reliable INFORMATION and accountant must try to present those reports fulfilling consumers INFORMATIONal needs. For avoiding inaccurate selection, accountant must find out priorities that consumers believe in these characteristics. In this research, two hypotheses have been proposed and necessary INFORMATION for testing of these hypotheses has been collected via questionnaire from typical persons of consumers (Principals of creditors shareholders) and producers (Accountants). In this research two tests named, Lamen-Vitini and Fridman have been used. Present results of this research shows that difference in importance of qualitative characteristic of INFORMATION between every consumers and producers. has proved %99 by means of Lamen-Vitini test and this result means beginning of these differences analysis and also in importance of qualitative of INFORMATION consumers decisions, by means of Fridman test, %99 in reliance range showed this difference. So by this spectral test of consumers priorities in qualitative characteristics of INFORMATION, we can use that result when a INFORMATION producer prepares some INFORMATION for the particular consumer or can not select among two or more qualitative characteristics of INFORMATION.

Yearly Impact:

View 1862

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Issue Info: 
  • Year: 

    2012
  • Volume: 

    7 (17)
  • Issue: 

    2 (87)
  • Pages: 

    131-158
Measures: 
  • Citations: 

    0
  • Views: 

    940
  • Downloads: 

    128
Abstract: 

Classical theory of ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION predicts a positive correlation between risk and insurance coverage. Using a sample of 69553 policyholders in Iran Insurance Company with optional items in the car’s body insurance contract, which provides significant and relevant INFORMATION on the preferences of costumers, this research intends to test the prediction. Statistical tests have been conducted by the conditional independence Bivariate Probit model and Nonparametric Statistics which have been pioneered in Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Chiappori et al (2006).The distinctive feature of the research is the use of individual data of policyholders in the oligopolistic Iran’s Insurance market. Our findings confirm realistic expectation and positive correlation in Iran’s Automobile Insurance Market (IAIM), which indicates a strict evidence of Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard in the market. These results imply inefficiency in IAIM and the existence of INFORMATIONally inconsistent insurance contracts in the insurance industry of Iran.

Yearly Impact:

View 940

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