The murder of the testator by the heir in testamentary disposition (testament for disposition of personal property), while challenging and lacking in research background, raises the question of whether such a murder can deprive the legatee of taking possession of the bequest (legacy). Three jurisprudential views based on the investigations can be considered in this regard that the murder of the testator by the legatee has no effect on taking position of the legatee according to the famous view and the legatee is still the owner of the bequest (legacy). However, two other views, in a little detail, are based on the fact that murdering a testator by the legatee as in the case of inheritance would prevent the legatee from the bequest (legacy). The present article considers the famous theory acceptable by using a descriptive-analytical method and using library resources, while critically analyzing and evaluating the jurisprudential fundamentals of the proposed views and also considers the prevention of the legatee from the bequest more acceptable by arguing that on the one hand, no evidence that stipulates the prevention of murdering from testamentary disposition (testament for disposition of personal property) and the absoluteness of verses, traditions and principle as the main reason for the famous point of view, each of them can be undermined in some ways and does not have the authority to prove the famous point of view.

There is a consensus among Muslims that murderers are forbidden from inheritance. The main question of this research is that if the legatee murders the testator or the chamberlain, is it possible to extend the sentence of a forbidden murderer of inheritance to a will? Three hypotheses were put forward. Each one of the hypothesis was analyzed. The first case is if he commits murder with the intention of acquiring inheritance, and the second case is if he has no intention of acquiring inheritance. The second hypothesis is that the testator is an heir, and the same two states are assumed for the second hypothesis.

According to the viewpoint of the majority of “ Imamieh Jurists” , in the presumption of death of legatee before the rejection or acceptance of the will, the right to reject or accept a will is inherited to the legatee’ s heirs. Against, the other viewpoint distinguished between the death of legatee after and before the death of testator and they are believed that in the first case, the will is void and in the latter, the right to accept or reject is inherited. Most Sunni jurists have accepted this view. Some jurists say if testator intend the will for only legatee, right of acceptance or rejection of this will don't transfer to his heirs unless the testator intention is to transfer the right of acceptance or rejection. Article 21 of the Egyptian Code of Will accepted the transfer of the right of acceptance or rejection the legatee heirs absolutely, but Iranian law does not have a clear statement in this regard. In this research, after studying the points of view about inheritance of the right of acceptance or rejection of the will and the reasons of proponents and opponents of each views in Islam Jurisprudence, Egypt Law and Iranian Law, The result is that in Iranian Law, the inheritance of the right of acceptance or rejection of the will can be accepted absolutely; unless, the testator intend to will just for legatee, so that, the will is dissolved as a result of legatee’ s death.

Background and Aim: One of the most challenging and controversial issues in relating to the will is the difficulty with recognizing the factors imposing suspension on the will. The present paper deals with giving credence to a testamentary disposition by heirs and heiresses. Materials and Methods: This descriptive-analytical research was done using documentary and library studies. Results: A will is a type of possession that a person leaves before their death. When it comes to a testamentary disposition, after affirmation of the testator, the exact recognition of the nature of the pre-deceased beneficiaries' acceptance will have many effects. If acceptance of succession is considered as a part or fundamental of a will to the extent that the will is invalid without it, then the testamentary disposition is thought of as a contract that the Islamic jurists largely concur with it. Nevertheless, when acceptance of succession is invalid or the will is regarded as one of the irresistible factors of the transfer, the will is possessory. In such cases, having good morals relating to giving credence to such a will is of importance. Ethical considerations: Confidentiality and trustworthiness have been carefully observed throughout this paper. Conclusion: Islamic jurists suggest that a will shall not be valid for a heir except when it is approved by other heirs. When it comes to the nature of the testamentary disposition more than one third of the estate, most jurists have regarded it as a will bequeathed by the testator which its acceptance needs the consent of other heirs. With regard to the time of ratification, most jurists believe that admitting or denying a will is only possible after the death of the testator, and so the rejection or acceptance of the will by the heirs during the testator's life has no jurisprudential or legal value. Therefore, morality requires that the heirs give credence to a will after the testator's death by approving of what the deceased has bequeathed.

Making a will by the testator and accepting or disclaiming it by the donee and executor requires the intention. As a rule, the main element of any juridical act (whether a contract or a unilateral juridical act) is the intention. As one of the types of juridical acts, the testamentary (will) is not exempted from this rule. Indeed, as one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia stated: “Intention being the life and soul of a will, it can hardly be imagined, I presume, that a man can make a will without intending to do so, or give by it more than he means to give".In Iranian law, when discussing the intention of individuals in a testamentary (will), it is important to take care of the intention of the testator, donee, and executor. Thus, in the will, on the one hand, the testator wants to bring his wish to the fore to manage the affairs and property after death. On the other hand, the donee or executor (of course with exceptions) can disclaim the will for various reasons. Therefore, the principle of sovereignty of the intention in the will can be examined from the angles above.American law is almost similar to Iranian law. In this legal system, when the principle of sovereignty of intention is considered from the perspective of the testator, the term "Freedom of Disposition" is used. On the contrary, when the topic under discussion is related to accepting or disclaiming the will by the donee, the term "Freedom of Inheritance" is used. Based on this, the principle of sovereignty of the testator's intention means the testator is a person who decides which property to transfer to whom and to what extent. The principle of sovereignty of the donee's intention also means the testator's authority to accept or at least disclaim the will. In this legal system, the "Testamentary Trust" is also used to fulfill the testamentary. In the testamentary trust, the testator accommodates the desired property to a person named "Trustee" so that he can manage the said property as a "Fiduciary" in favor of the "Beneficiary"."Principle of Sovereignty of the Intention" has now created these questions in the authors' minds: First, what is the basis of the principle of the sovereignty of the intention of the testator, the donee, and the executor? Second, can we imagine limitations for the intention of the testator, donee, and executor? If the answer is “Yes”, what are the examples of these limitations?In this article, by a comparative study of Imamia Jurisprudence, Iranian and American Law, an attempt is made to answer the above questions with a descriptive-analytical method and by referring to library sources. The reason for adapting this issue to American law can be summed up in two ways: First, in the legal system of this country, issues related to wills (especially the sovereignty of the will) are very important and have been examined in detail by scholars in the field of inheritance and wills. Second, Iranian jurists consider Imamia Jurisprudence when examining the challenges raised in the realm of wills, contrary to the approach that exists in the law of contracts and civil liability. Although this approach seems to be acceptable and good considering the Iranian civil law based on Islamic jurisprudence, but it cannot stop the curious mind from comparing the will rights with the western legal systems. In the end, after studying the history of the mentioned principle, the following results are obtained: First, the testator's natural right, his motivation, securing the interests of the testator, setting the behavior of potential heirs, and duty to social cooperation are considered the basis of the testator's will. Also, preserving the independence of the donee and executor, the cooperation of the donee in managing the distribution of the estate, and ensuring the interests of the testator are the basis of the sovereignty of the testator's will. Second, while the formalities of making a will, the necessary heirs, the mandatory rules, and religion are the limitations of the sovereignty of the intention of the testator, the formalities of accepting or disclaiming the will and killing the testator by the donee are the limitations of the sovereignty of the intention of the donee and executor.

The legal issue of last will and testament in favor of the fetus (unborn child), is one of the legal subjects which is fully discussed in Islamic Jurisprudence books. But in the Iranian Civil Code there are just two articles in this relation i.e. article 1851 and 1852. There is some controversies in relation to the conditions necessary for validity of this kind of last will and testament. Islamic jurisprudence scholars have generally stated three conditions for such last will and testament for the fetus to be valid. First of all, to benefit from civil rights in general and last will and testament in particular, the fetus must be in existence at the time at which the last will and testament is being made. Secondly the fetus must be born alive even though he or she dies immediately after birth. Finally, they maintain that the offer of the last will and testament needs to be accepted, otherwise it is not effective. This article is aiming to examine the necessity of these conditions.The method used in this Article is descriptive-analytical. Data have been collected by taking notes from relevant sources and have been analyzed with regard to the views of Islamic Jurisprudence scholars and civil provisions. The findings of the contribution are: 1. There is no doubt about the validity of the will and testament in favor of the fetus. 2. The fetus must be in existence at the time at which the last will and testament is being made. 3. It is necessary for the validity of such last will that the fetus come into birth alive. 4. There is no need for last will and testament for the fetus to be accepted.