Clarifying why some proposals have not yet been able to remove Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples

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Soleimani Khormouji Mahdi; Fath Taheri Ali; Sayf Seed Masoud

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Shinakht Year:2021 | Volume: | Issue: Page(s): 149-176

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Information Journal Paper

Title

Clarifying why some proposals have not yet been able to remove Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples

Author(s)

Soleimani Khormouji Mahdi | Fath Taheri Ali | Sayf Seed Masoud | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

Gettier (Gettier-type) Counterexamples

Tripartite Definition of Knowledge

Belief

Truth

Jus tification

Intuitions

Ordinary Language Philosophy

Experimental Philosophy

Abstract

Many epis temologis ts acknowledge that the importance of Gettier’s counterexamples is in revealing the problem we encounter when analyzing the concept of knowledge. As they assert, the root of the problem lies in the way we evaluate our Intuitions used for conceptual analysis. We, here, are to look into those Intuitions which, more than the nature of knowledge, are related to knowledge attribution in ordinary language. It seems likely that they help us find out a way to remove Gettier’s counterexamples or other similar cases known today as Gettier-type counterexamples. The article consis ts of two main parts. Firs t, we will explain three proposals that result in taking away the condition of Jus tification, Truth and Belief, respectively. Taking away one of the traditional conditions of knowledge can be a possibe way to protect the conceptual analysis of knowledge from Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples. In the second part, we will clarify why these three proposals, and similar ones, have not yet been able to remove Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples. We believe that they have three main flaws. (1) Not all possible cases of knowledge are covered. (2) Some arguments are not conclusive. (3) They either involve some misunders tandings about the nature of ordinary language and the way its words work, or, from a methodological viewpoint, are ill-founded and have controversial consequences. Although the firs t and second flaws are limited to those proposals criticized in this article, we believe that the third one can go even further and include those proposals that pave the way to remove Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples by relying on our Intuitions about the nature of knowledge.

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