Paper Information

Journal:   PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION RESEARCH (NAMAH-I HIKMAT)   SPRING-SUMMER 2017 , Volume 15 , Number 1 (29) #R0040; Page(s) 191 To 212.
 
Paper: 

THE NEW LOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL AND FREE WILL DEFENSE OBLIGATION

 
 
Author(s):  NAMAVAR FATEMEH, NABAVI LOTFOLLAH*, SAEEDIMEHR MOHAMMAD
 
* DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, TARBIAT MODARES UNIVERSITY, TEHRAN, IRAN
 
Abstract: 

The argument based on the existence of evil in the world, as an atheistic argument against the existence of God, has two versions: logical and evidential. In this article, we have merely dealt with the first version that attempts to prove a logical inconsistency in the theists’ set of beliefs. Many hold that the traditional logical problem of evil has found a definite answer through Plantinga’s free will defense. However, in recent years, John Schellenberg has claimed a new logical problem of evil. He holds that Plantinga’s free will defense would not refute this new version. In the present paper, without any concern for fully criticizing Schellenberg’s new problem of evil and without any intent for completely representing Plantinga’s free will defense, we have challenged Schellenberg’s claim about the immunity of his version to Plantinga’s free will defense. Through undermining one of the central premises of his argument, we prove that this version is also vulnerable to plantinga’s solution.

 
Keyword(s): LOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL, SCHELLENBERG, FREE WILL DEFENSE, PLANTINGA
 
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