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Paper Information

Journal:   DANESHVAR RAFTAR   DECEMBER 2006-JANUARY 2007 , Volume 13 , Number 20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7); Page(s) 85 To 94.
 
Paper: 

Government Managing On The Behavior Of Auditors And Taxpayers When There Probability Of Evasion In The Tax Reports

 
 
Author(s):  Navidi H.R., Abdoli Gh.
 
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Abstract: 
In this paper we are going to investigate the collusion between tax payers and tax auditor (inspector) in order to take evasive action in taxpaying, in a simple game theatrical model. In this model from the government (or tax administration) view point, there are kinds of tow auditors: honest and dishonest and There is the probability that the taxpayer may collude with dishonest auditors, and repeat the tax low. Therefore, in this model there are three players: taxpayers, auditors, and the Government. The aim of the government in this game is to select a strategy that maximizes tax incomes and minimizes tax evasion (net income). We found a condition in which the net income maximized the collusion parameter.
Keyword(s): STRATEGY, HONEST AND DISHONEST AUDITOR, COLLUSION AND REMUNERATION, PROBABILITY OF COLLUSION, TAX INCOME, INSPECTION
 
 
 
International related papers: 
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References: 
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Citations: 
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+ Click to Cite.
APA: Copy

NAVIDI, H., & ABDOLI, G. (2007). GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS. DANESHVAR RAFTAR, 13(20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7)), 85-94. https://www.sid.ir/en/journal/ViewPaper.aspx?id=273937



Vancouver: Copy

NAVIDI H.R., ABDOLI GH.. GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS. DANESHVAR RAFTAR. 2007 [cited 2022January18];13(20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7)):85-94. Available from: https://www.sid.ir/en/journal/ViewPaper.aspx?id=273937



IEEE: Copy

NAVIDI, H., ABDOLI, G., 2007. GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS. DANESHVAR RAFTAR, [online] 13(20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7)), pp.85-94. Available: https://www.sid.ir/en/journal/ViewPaper.aspx?id=273937.



 
 
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