Paper Information

Journal:   DANESHVAR RAFTAR   DECEMBER 2006-JANUARY 2007 , Volume 13 , Number 20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7); Page(s) 85 To 94.
 
Paper: 

GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS

 
Author(s):  NAVIDI H.R., ABDOLI GH.
 
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Abstract: 

In this paper we are going to investigate the collusion between tax payers and tax auditor (inspector) in order to take evasive action in taxpaying, in a simple game theatrical model. In this model from the government (or tax administration) view point, there are kinds of tow auditors: honest and dishonest and There is the probability that the taxpayer may collude with dishonest auditors, and repeat the tax low. Therefore, in this model there are three players: taxpayers, auditors, and the Government. The aim of the government in this game is to select a strategy that maximizes tax incomes and minimizes tax evasion (net income). We found a condition in which the net income maximized the collusion parameter.

 
Keyword(s): STRATEGY, HONEST AND DISHONEST AUDITOR, COLLUSION AND REMUNERATION, PROBABILITY OF COLLUSION, TAX INCOME, INSPECTION
 
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