| Abstract:
What is required for a belief to be justified? How are we justified in holding belief about external world? Contrary to externalism, the internalist foundationalism believes that, there are epistemic or intellectual duties or obligations to be fulfilled before one assent to justified propositional beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to criticize Chisholm’s internalism.
Though internalist theory is more plausible than its rivals, it is not sufficient for justification of beliefs, and needs some complementary account to be sufficient for a belief to be rationally justified. I will show that there are some problems in Chisholm's approach to justification of beliefs. Since the majority of our knowledge is knowledge by representaion, we need to have a connective bridge between subject and objects.
From Sadra’s philosophy, I will offer a connective bridge between subject and external object trough the mental form theory. By conforming to knowledge by presence we may have a straightforward account of justification of beliefs about the physical world, in particular sensory experience.
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