U.S Offensive Policy toward Iran's Security in the Middle East and Persian Gulf after 33 day's War

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Abstract

U.S foreign policy interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region has always had three components: economy, security and politics. It is not overstated to stress the centrality of energy resources in the economic sector as a predominant factor. In this context, securing access to energy and the flow of oil become vital for world economic prosperity. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, added more impetus to the U.S security issues in the Persian Gulf. President Bush's doctrine of "preemptive war" and "the global war on terror" placed the Persian Gulf region at the heart of his post-9/11 strategic vision. The Bush administration used the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington as a great opportunity to revamp the regional security by undertaking some drastic measures. The invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the idea of regime change in Iran as well as other American Neocons' grandiose plans about the necessity to reshape the "Greater Middle East", made governments in the region nervous. In addition, by giving prominence to the "security question" over all other considerations, the US policy plunged the region deeper into uncertainty.

Washington has systematically tried, and to a large extent succeeded, to securitize the inter-state relations in the region. This approach combined with the NATO plan to further its regional partnership, made any significant rapprochement among the Persian Gulf states on the issue of security almost impossible. For these reasons, a collective regionally crafted security arrangement that includes littoral states of Iran, Iraq the countries of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council would be unattainable in a foreseeable future.

Keywords: Security arrangement, Security, Preventive strike, War, Iran.

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1. Introduction

Because of its great strategic value, the Persian Gulf waterway has always been of particular interest both to the regional and foreign Powers. In the past, when control of the maritime routes guaranteed the supremacy of European states, dominating the Persian Gulf Ports was the supremacy of European states, dominating the Persian Gulf ports was the subject of covetousness for these powers, particularly the British Empire. The discovery of oil, combined with the Cold War exigencies, captured the attention of new emerging powers towards this region.

The United States post-Cold War era dominance transformed Washington's concerns, into world concerns. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The White House, 1999) (December 1999) identifies a range of threats to U.S. Security. President Clinton announced that "the goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of our nation's fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory intact, and provide for the prosperity of the nation and its people. He also firmly stated that the strategy will achieve three core objectives of "enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy".

The question of this article is about how the orientation of U.S security policy toward Iran is forming? Thus, a logical question arises: how is it possible to create a favorable environment that will enable oil producing states to send their oil to the world market while still allowing consumer countries to meet their energy needs in safety?

U.S. security policy in Bush era was adopted as to confront Iran's strategic objectives. To that end U.S policy underwent a change from engagement to confrontation. The axis of evil policy left its mark after the 33-day war in Lebanon. The confrontation policy required the U.S to use pressure and containment diplomacy in dealing with Iran.
2. Methodology
This paper descriptive and analytical methods and relying on the library resources has trying to review U.S Offensive Policy toward Iran's Security in the Middle East and Persian Gulf after 33 day's War.

3. Theoretical formwork
3-1. U.S Middle East Policy in Pre-Emptive Doctrine
For President Clinton, protecting the U.S. would be realized only through the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. The President's assessment diverged from the appraisal of his Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, as stated in his Annual Report to the President and the Congress (1999): "America's security relies upon a military that can shape and respond to world events, while at the same time preparing for the uncertain challenges of the future."

3-2. U.S Policy and Interests in Bush Doctrine
Succeeding the Clinton administration's policies and forced to manage the traumatized America after 9/11, President George W. Bush sought an integrated regional approach to bolster US security objectives. He was comforted by the sympathy of NATO and growing military / security partnership with the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council States.

A set of measures adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 by Bush's White House, where Vice-President Dick Cheney and his neoconservative entourage were engineering a brand new – refurbished security architecture, helped to project American power and influence into areas viewed as vital to US interests. The grave nature of terrorist attacks, combined with instantaneously available shocking footage, gave a new impetus to US outreach actions. They enjoyed a greater legitimacy accorded to the victims of a universally decried attack.

In Bush's integrated regional approach, the Middle East Israeli-Palestinian conflict and favored the two-state solution as part of a new security equation to protect America. It was ironic for Bush junior to implicitly recognize the essence of Saddam Hussein's message on the
interconnectivity of security issues in the Middle East; the message that Bush senior didn't want to know about in the heat of the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990-1991 (Questi, 2007: 14).

3-3. the Instruments of Pre-Emptive Doctrine
In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and assure their future prosperity. The course of events following the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2002 and the US-led coalition forces' assault on Iraq in March 2003 depicts a very different picture of this ideal world.


It seems that the White House under Bush is out of control with respect to honoring human rights. Retired Major General Tony Taguba, who was enlisted by the Army to conduct an initial investigation into the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, has recently denounced the Bush Commander-in-Chief [President Bush] and those under him authorized a systematic regime of torture," Taguba wrote. "After years of disclosures by government investigations, media accounts, and reports from human rights organizations, there is no longer any doubt as to whether the current administration has committed war crimes. The only question is whether those who ordered the use of torture will be held to account" (Benjamin, 2008:3).

Behind the façade of conducting a 'just war' on terror, the Bush administration continued to court the Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf to assume a bigger share of the war costs and participate more actively in shaping the entire region of the Middle East. Americans have been satisfied by PGCC States defense spending, even before the war on terror (Lynch,
This burden-sharing has already been observed by the council members during Clinton presidency. In 1997, the U.S. government urged its allies to increase their efforts in defense spending. A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense (2000) indicates that all six PGCC States met the Congressional defense spending objectives, since the shares of GDP they spent on defense during 1999 were all greater than United States’ 3.2-percent.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar all had shares in the 10 to 14 percent range. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates’ 1999 defense spending share was over 18 percent higher than its 1998 share. The UAE was also one of two PGCC states that achieved the Congressional multinational military activities target – the other was Qatar – by increasing their levels of funding for UN Peace operations during 1990th and the first decade of 21 century.

Two other council members also achieved the Congressional foreign assistance target in 1998: Saudi Arabia by making an increase of almost 23 percent in its foreign assistance funding, and Kuwait by spending just over one percent of its GDP on foreign assistance (Cohen, 2000: 4).

### 3-4. the U.S Principal Security Partners

The U.S government values the southern littoral states of the Persian Gulf as its principal security partners in this region. They continued to spend above-average shares of GDP on defense despite reductions in oil prices in 1998. Relative to its share of total GDP, Bahrain contributed the largest share of ground combat capability; the second largest share of combat aircraft; and the third largest share of military naval tonnage.

The report emphasizes that no other state in the Report matches this performance in all three armed services. Kuwait's foreign assistance contributions proportion to its GDP is second only to Denmark's, and it is the only other state that meets the highly ambitious Congressional foreign assistance target of contributing one percent of its GDP. Kuwait provides
significant grant aid and humanitarian assistance to lesser-developed countries, primarily in the Arab world, but also includes nations in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Balkans, the Report states (Gearon, 2007: 14).

Immediately after praising them for their military effort, the Report invokes the existence of a substantial disparity between the military forces of the PGCC states and those of their principal antagonists in the Persian Gulf. (Cohen, 2000) Iran is the apparent target of this evaluation because the only other non-PGCC state in the region is Iraq, considered to be client-states to the U.S. As a remedy to bridge this gap in the PGCC collective ability to defend the region.

4. Result & discussion

4-1. the Role of U.S Military Instruments for Containing Iran

Washington favors the following measures: to extend its military umbrella over the friendly countries in the Persian Gulf through a massive military presence and build-up mainly in Qatar and Bahrain; a close military cooperation between this council members and other pro-American Arab states (Egypt and Jordan as being the only viable players in the region); and a massive sale of military hardware to enhance the capability.

Washington extensively enjoys the largesse of all PGCC client states as the following passage of the above-mentioned Report shows. Washington pays tribute to its PGCC partners for their contribution to regional security by providing U.S. forces the use of military facilities, transit rights, and other forms of access. Bahrain, for example, has provided port facilities to U.S. naval forces for 50 years; it also hosts the headquarters for U.S Naval Forces Central Command, furnishes facilities for prepositioned equipment, and has granted rapid access for U.S military aircraft when needed(Blanchard, 2008: 16).

Oman likewise allows the United States to preposition equipment on its territory, and has granted access to its military bases since 1980. Since the (Persian) Gulf War (1991), defense cooperation agreements permitting
access and pre-positioning have been signed with Kuwait Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Under the agreement with Kuwait, that nation has agreed to offset U.S. pre-positioning and exercise costs.

At the end of 1999, Kuwait housed the bulk of U.S. ground troops in the region and much of our air power. Saudi Arabia also provides access to U.S. forces, contributes substantially to offset the costs of U.S. military operations UN sanctions on Iraq, and funded the construction of a $120 million friendly forces housing complex.

In addition, since November 1995, both Bahrain and Qatar have hosted several Air Expeditionary Force deployments in support of Operation Southern Watch. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates contributed forces to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo – its first ever out-of-area deployment (Cohen, 2000: 45).

Four devastating wars have created the opportunity for the U.S to regain and reinforce the position they had in the Middle East before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. American rehabilitation started with the Iraq–Iran war (1980-1988). The Kuwaiti crisis (1990-1991) consolidated the U.S. Partial domination over the region. The events of 9/11 contributed to the denunciation of Islam and pretending it as a violent religion and depicted Muslims as terrorists and anti-Westerners.

As a result, the war on the Taliban and the subsequent occupation of Afghanistan extended the long military arm of the U.S, portrayed as apparent savior of Muslims from the tyranny of their own Islamist rulers. With the invasion of Iraq (2003), the U.S. became a Middle Eastern country in the same way they became European after the World War II. As their presence in Afghanistan and Iraq continues, America behaves like other states in the region by interfering in regional security affairs.

In this Introduction to the 2003 Report, Donald Rumsfeld builds on the Afghan and Iraq wars. He established the leading military missions given to U.S. military forces under a transformed defense strategy as: defending the United States; assuring friends and allies; deterring aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping
major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to pursue a
decisive victory in one of those conflicts, including the possibility of regime
change or occupation; and conducting a limited number of smaller-scale
contingency operations (Rumsfeld, 2003).

4-2. the Role of U.S Alliance for Containing Iran
In May 2006, the American administration launched a new (Persian) Gulf
Security Dialogue (GS) that principal coordination mechanism between the
U.S. and these littoral states. The core objectives of the Dialogue are the
promotion of intra-PGCC and PGCC-U.S. cooperation to meet common
perceived threats. He couldn't be more explicit in stating how
redesigning and transforming U.S. forces are a crucial instrument of
American foreign policy.

The Dialogue provides a framework for U.S. engagement with the PGCC
countries in the following six areas: (1) the improvement of PGCC defense
capabilities and interoperability; (2) regional security issues such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Lebanon; (3) counter-proliferation; (4)
counter-terrorism and internal security; (5) critical infrastructure protection;
and (6) commitments to Iraq (Blanchard & Grimmest, 2008: 1).

There is no doubt about the real nature of this one-sided Dialogue as past
practice of U.S.-PGCC relations show, as the creation of PGCC was a
reaction to the Iranian revolutionaries perceived threat in war with Iraq.
Some of council conservative members were actively supporting Iraq in its
war efforts against Iran. It's worth mentioning the depth of dependency with
regards to Arab states and the U.S. military for their security.

In spite of the existing regional organizations such as the league of Arab
States and the September 30, 2006, the United States delivered over $72
billion in weapons, training, equipment, and related services to the six
member states of the council through the government-to-government
Foreign Military Sales program. Over $57 billion of these sales were made
to Saudi Arabia (Defense Security, 2006).

It seems that Washington justifies the Arab purchase of U.S. armaments,
especially after the regime change in Iraq, as a measure to counter Iran. In late July 2007, the United States announced new military pacts worth 20 billion dollars for Saudi Arabia, 13 billion dollars for Egypt and 30 billion dollars for Israel in a bid to counter and confronting Iran.

Details of the new Middle East military sale/aid came as secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, left Washington for a joint trip to the region, seeking assurances of help in stabilizing Iraq and forging new assistance agreements with the Persian Gulf States, Israel, and Egypt: Rice said in a statement.

Beside the usual political rhetoric about the reasons for her government's actions, Secretary Rice alleges that the arms sales are necessary to bolster forces of moderation and support a broader strategy to counter the negative influences of Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. "The arms package for Saudi Arabia covers missile defenses, early warning systems, air power and naval systems to counter Iran", said a senior US defense official briefing reporters traveling with gates (AFP, 2007).

Arms sales are a powerful component of the U.S. and other defense firms regard the [Persian] Gulf kingdoms as an especially lucrative market today, given that record oil prices have them swimming in surplus revenue. The six PGCC states spent $233 billion on arms imports from 2000 to 2005, accounting for 70 percent of total armament expenditures in the Arab world" (Gearon, 2007: 65).

The U.S. government has always attached conditions for the use of arms purchased by Arab countries. This package follows the same rational. "In October 2007, 188 Members [of Congress] signed a letter to president Bush stating that unless the Administration provides assurances that the sale of JDAM [Joint direct Attack Munitions] kits to Saudi Arabia will not 'harm U.S. forces in the region or undercut Israel's qualitative military advantage'.

They are prepared JDAM sale. The letter also called for regular reporting, tight Congressional oversight, and intense consultations' with Israel. Representatives of the American-Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC) have stated that AIPAC 'supports the Kirk-Carney letter and
affords by Congress to seek assurances from the administration that ironclad measures will be included in the final arms package to ensure the safety of American troops and [U.S.] allies in the region'.

In November 2007, 117 Members signed a letter to president Bush requesting that formal notification regarding any proposals to sell 'high technology armaments to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia' be postponed until January 15, 2008" (Blanchard & Grimmett, 2008: 1).

The joint AIPAC-Congressional pressure on the white House appeared to be an extra assurance since in July 2007; Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert confirmed that Israel had received a detailed and explicit commitment from the United States to ensure Israel's qualitative military edge over the Arab states. This has been reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Barak during an October 2007 visit to Washington, where he stated that Israel has understandings and arrangements with the U.S. Administration that make Tel Aviv confident that Israel's military qualitative edge will be kept (Blanchard & Grimmett, 2008: 1).

4-3. Americanization the Security of Persian Gulf
In the volatile and unsettled context of security in the Persian Gulf and in absence of an effective regionally generated cooperation, dominant foreign powers have always attempted to position themselves as guarantor of stability in the region. One of the consequences of this presence is widening the security gap among the eight Persian Gulf states (Benjamin, 2008: 14).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a newcomer in the Persian Gulf. For the Alliance, the region encompasses a vital strategic importance for three reasons: 1. Its geographic location; 2. its continuing instability and 3. Its energy resources—approximately 60% of the world's oil reserves are located in the region. Moreover, the Persian Gulf counties hold the world's second (Iran), third (Qatar), fourth (Saudi Arabia) and fifth (UAE) natural gas reserves after Russia. The current increase in oil prices is a reminder of how the global economy is heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf's energy resources and will remain so far decades to come.
By the same account, NATO assumes that region's volatile security has recently been aggravated because of the new global security threats posed by internationally active terrorist groups and the (alleged) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Most countries in the region are facing the danger of potential extremist and terrorist activity on their territory, with perhaps profound implications for the stability of the Middle East as a whole.

The Persian Gulf also presents an increased strategic importance for NATO's ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The future of Iraq is a crucial determinant for the whole region. All NATO member states are highly aware of the dangers of instability in Iraq and of the importance of assisting the new Iraqi authorities to take control of the security situation themselves.

Moreover, Iran, by far the most populous country, is emerging as a more powerful state in the region. NATO assumes that a nuclear capable Iran, with ballistic missiles capacity, would be a truly frightening prospect. Therefore, developments in the Persian Gulf and the Greater Middle East are likely to have an increasingly important impact on Euro-Atlantic security.

Because of its strategic importance, there has been considerable Western, primarily US, military presence in the Persian Gulf for decades. After 9/11, the perception of the region's pivotal international security role has further increased. The PGCC states who have basing agreements with the United States, the most powerful NATO member, serve as important bridgeheads for the hyper-power. Furthermore, in the context of the war against terrorism, forces from NATO member countries have been operating in the region.

For example, a US Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) team has conducted a series of exercises in the Arabian Sea in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Until Late 2003, Germany had an NBC battalion in Kuwait, which was stationed there before the Iraq war provides protection from a potential Iraqi biological and chemical weapons
attack. The German battalion was part of a multinational NBC contingent based in Doha, which also comprises Czech forces, among others.

Despite American push for more military cooperation between the PGCC States, cyclic in the region revealed the Peninsula Shields' incapability to provide any worthy security for its state-members. Based on an inter-Arab initiative called "Damascus Declaration Based on an inter-Arab initiative called "Damascus Declaration" (March 1991), Syria and Egypt were expected to provide forces to the Peninsula Shield.

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Under the pretext of "growing air and naval threats from Iran and from terrorist infiltration by sea", the United States is reportedly planning to focus on improving the council state naval and air cooperation. In mid-2006, the Bush Administration began efforts to revive and build on the Clinton Administration's 'Cooperative Defense Initiative' to integrate the PGCC defenses with each other and with the United States and NATO alliance.

Under that initiative, in early 2001, the Southern Persian Gulf littoral states inaugurated its 'Belt of Cooperation' network for joint tracking of aircraft and coordination of air defense systems, built by Raytheon. Another part of that initiative, to which Bush Administration officials are attaching new importance, is U.S-PGCC joint training to defend against a chemical or biological attack, as well as more general joint military training and exercises.

The Cooperative Defense Initiative was a scaled-back version of an earlier U.S idea to develop and deploy a PGCC-wide theater missile defense
(TMD) system. However, this missile defense concept is reportedly a focus of the renew Bush Administration initiative, in response to Iran's growing missile capabilities. The original idea envisioned a system under which separate parts (detection systems, intercept missiles, and other equipment) of an integrated TMD network would be based in the six different constraints PGCC states.

That concept ran up against PGCC states' financial constraints and differing perceptions among the [Persian] Gulf States of the threat environment. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have Patriot antimissile units of their own, and these states, in addition to Qatar, host U.S.-controlled patriot systems" (Katzman, 2006: 18).

As debate surrounding Iran's nuclear program heats up, the question of non-proliferation, even de-proliferation, became prominent in the U.S security approach to the Persian Gulf. For instance, the 2006 Bush Administration joint U.S-PGCC security initiative focused on counter-proliferation actions as Washington encouraged the PGCC States to close Iranian companies which might be used to procure WMD technology. Another aspect of the initiative is to track shipments to Iran. The Bahrain-based 5\textsuperscript{th} Fleet/ Nascent command plays a major role in part rolling the Persian Gulf to prevent smuggling (Katzman, 2006: 19).

The U.S invasion of Iraq in March 2003 removed and threat to Washington's PGCC client-stated emanating from Bagdad. Other (alleged) viable menaces to American and its NATO allies interest in the Persian Gulf come from "Iran's nuclear program and extremist Islamists", as stated by the Alliance Secretary General in a visit to the PGCC States in late January 2008 (MirEmadi, 2008).

Following the regime change in Baghdad, 16 NATO Allies have troops deployed in Iraq. Moreover, all 26 NATO countries have contributed to NATO's training mission there, either inside or outside of Iraq. For example, German forces were training Iraqi police and soldiers in the UAE.
4-4. Confrontation Iran from South Neighbors

A combination of self-generated fear of Iran in the Arab world, American efforts to isolate Iran in the region and Tehran's inability to communicate clearly its intentions, resulted in rendering Iran's nuclear program as the most dominating on the Persian Gulf and international security. While Tehran insists on the peaceful nature of its program, certain countries are suspicious about this claim. They have tried, and to some extent could successfully convince the UN Security Council and have invoked, to some of Iran's neighbors, that this program could not be justified under a civilian nuclear energy program (Ownes, 2009: 115).

Based on rumors and US accusations about the real nature of Tehran's nuclear intentions, NATO alleges the greatest fear is that a nuclear-armed Iran would incite a nuclear arms race in the region and could lead to further WMD proliferation. Now that the context of an imminent threat is so carefully and successfully crafted, then the rational conclusion would be a way to stop Iran's nuclear program for the sake of non-proliferation.

The continuation of the events indicates that the Iranian case become a pretext for certain powers to extend their influence and to conclude lucrative military-economic contracts with some states in the Persian Gulf area. During his visit to Abu Dhabi, in January 2008, the latest stop on his tour of the Persian Gulf, French President Nicolas Sarkozy concluded a deal with his counterpart, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, on nuclear co-operation that could be worth up to $ billion. France already has long-standing military co-operation accords with countries in the region, including the UAE and Qatar.

The accord for co-operation in civilian nuclear activities, a first step toward building a nuclear reactor, would be the third of such deals France has signed with Arab countries recently, after Libya, branded 'rogue state' until recently by Western powers, and Algeria. On the same trip, Sarkozy also offered Saudi Arabia nuclear assistance during his visit to the kingdom (Alberight, 2010: 66).

France generates a large majority of its power from nuclear reactors and
is keen to export its technology and expertise in developing civilian energy. In an interview with Al Jazeera while in Qatar, in January 2008, Sarkozy affirm Arab nations right to nuclear energy. However, he said the right did not extend to Iran, as he believed the Islamic Republic should prove definitively that it had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons before it should be allowed to develop civilian nuclear energy.

He said "It would be giving credit to the current Iranian regime if civilian nuclear energy is only used by western democracies. France tells Iran 'give up your race for a nuclear weapon – it's a risk and you don't really need it'. And, if you [Iran] stop the race for a nuclear weapon, you would have access to civilian nuclear power". Sarkozy's comment came as officials revealed that Areva, the French nuclear reactor manufacturer, had signed a $700 million electricity distribution and transmission deal with Qatar.

France's interest in the Persian Gulf is not limited to economic gains in a volatile environment. Their ambition is also of strategic nature. Sarkozy's nuclear deal was accompanied by a military accord when the UAE government asked for a French military presence on its territory by creating their first permanent military base in the Persian Gulf.

The accord could provide political and psychological comfort to Emirates by adding another layer to the security that the U.S is already supplying them. Contrary to the assessment made by regional observers, this accord complements the U.S. and NATO's previously described, plans for the region in the Persian Gulf does not a challenge to them.

A long-term French strategic position in the Persian Gulf does not confront American exclusivity, since there is no way that France could undermine the fundamental architecture of the hegemonic American position in the (Persian) Gulf. Multiplication of foreign players, whose interest fundamentally differs from that of indigenous people in the Persian Gulf, only complicate any regional attempt to achieve a security based on regional needs (Gates, 2010: 33).

It is absolutely certain that the multiplication of the Western military presence in the Persian Gulf intends to secure those objectives laid down by
NATO, i.e., energy security, combating 'political Islamism', and the alleged challenge of Iran nuclear program and securing Arab arms market for great powers. Indeed, it is to keep Iran out and the Western powers in. In this context, Russia, China and India will be peripheral Powers with limited interests in the region.

5-4. Iran's regional position after the 33-day war in Lebanon
Effects of 33-day war on of Iranian regional position can be such enumerated:

5-4-1. plays a pivotal role at Middle East peace process
Arab-Israeli dispute in Palestine has one of the widest regional and international crises, has had an important position in the foreign policy of powerful countries. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran according to their ideological principles of to support liberation movements such as Hezbollah and other Palestinian jihadi groups emphasizes. And the formation of effective Middle East peace process. Islamic Republic of Iran in order to influence negotiations of Middle East peace process and creating serious obstacles in its creation, in this regard has made use of the Hezbollah situation in Lebanon. Israeli invasion 33-day into Lebanon and the Hezbollah resistance against the attacks, Will reinforce the idea that whenever that Hezbollah, a regional the process of developments, including the Middle East peace process at risk and the main challenges in this area created.

5-4-2. Enhance military and intelligence position of Iran in the region and international Scale
Today's reliance on the military capabilities and information by advocacy groups outside the country is the most powerful instruments. Military and intelligence Hezbollah led to the 33-day war in Lebanon that Israel's army is suffered heavy military and intelligence, this ability is provided indirectly to Iran. Thereby relying Hezbollah allies outside from its borders. Military and informational can be displayed as a symbol of Iranian power against the
rival and warring countries, could have something to say.

5-4-3. Instruments deterrence of a possible war
In the under the present conditions where Iran by Western countries, especially the U.S. and Israel has been threatened and its officials are aware of the possibility of war with Iran; Can be attempt on the application of deterrent measures against these dangers be a rational justify. Was used by Potential Hezbollah in Lebanon. Of this regard. Hezbollah Secretary General of, Iran's continuous support at different times Iran's partiality against any external action related to Iran does not remain doubt about it.

5-4-4. Growth of Islamist streams in favor of Iran and opposed to the West
Success of Islamist movements in the Middle East started with Hezbollah, the Shiea victory in Iraq, of a majority of 132 seats in the Iraqi parliament, the unprecedented success of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" in the local council elections and won 74 seats out of 120 seats in the Palestinian parliament, Palestine and the executive power of arrest, Finally the rule of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood to U.S. strategic initiatives in the political and security challenges have created. This trend leads to increases the authority political and security status Islamist movements in the region and the West's and margin of security have created resistant for the Iran;

6. Conclusion
Western States try to isolate Iran in the Persian Gulf and create at the regional level a "coalition of Moderates", with the participation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, the United States, Britain, and other NATO members, against the so-called "coalition of Radicals/Extremists, Iran, Syria and their Middle Eastern dependents. If successful, NATO will become a global military organization that fabricates a new justification for its contested existence since the demise of the Soviet threat The PGCC-NATO military and security co-operation is constructed to contain their self-stated
"common challenge", i.e., Iran.

Iran with be better off by trying to replicate the kind of security model Russians have established in the Caspian Sea through bilateral security understanding, not agreements, with its less hostile Persian Gulf Arab neighbors. Long-term challenge to Iran's security and territorial integrity could emanate from Arab neighbors, not the United States.

1- The Persian Gulf Co-operation Council (PGCC) was created in response to the Iraq-Iran war as a regional security arrangement. Even if the establishment of a sub-regional security structure for protecting of the member states against a foreign threat was the main objective of the Council, the PGCC has failed to institute an integrated defense policy. One of the reasons for this failure is the imposing weight of Saudi Arabia inside the organization.

2- Division among the members on the relationship with Iran and the US invasion of Iraq also reveal serious problems that hamper the regional integration. Contrary to comments made by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal at the (Persian) Gulf Dialogue meeting in Bahrain in December 2004, the PGCC doesn't believe that the region requires guarantees provided by the collective with of the international community. All indications point to the US as the sole guarantor of PGCC Security and all other powers provide an accessory assistance to Washington.

3- The UAE is now less vulnerable to an eventual Tehran pressure than before. It seems that Iran should resign to and live with the permanency of her Arab neighbors' hostility that is caused by their inability to manage bilateral and multilateral relations with Tehran. For its parts, Iran has not been quite successful in convincing Arabs of its peaceful and non-belligerent intentions through concrete actions.

4- The current deadlock bolsters the U.S strategic position in the region as an indispensable protector of weak Arab regimes. Therefore It is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage an Iran-Arab security arrangement in the Persian Gulf in total absence of U.S involvement as a regional major player.
5- All past attempts by Iran to produce a tangible regional security environment have failed. Future efforts will also fail unless: 1. The U.S. is at the table and accede to creating such an indigenous regional collective security forum; 2. Iran's Middle East policy focuses on the Arab states instead of Arab militant groups. A more 'main-stream' approach has a better chance to succeed.

6- Anti-Shiite and anti-Persian sentiment exists throughout the Persian Gulf and in many other Arab states. The United Arab Emirates' territorial claims generate considerable Arab sympathy in the region. Arab leaders are unwilling to accept Iranian nuclear program.

7- Recent proposal by President Ahmadinejad of Iran about the creation of a new Persian Gulf security pact and a 12-point cooperation plan, including on free trade and joint investments in oil and gas including Iran assumed by some in the region and by the Westerns powers as an initiative for consolidating Iranian hegemony, not a genuine collective security arrangement (Lynch, 2008).

8- The final declaration of the summit reiterated the PGCC position of demanding a peaceful solution" to Iran's nuclear crisis, while it exhorted Tehran to "pursue dialogue with the international community". The PGCC has already announced plans to launch its own nuclear program, for civilian purposes only. A proposal by the group for an internationally controlled consortium to provide Middle East countries with enriched uranium was received without enthusiasm by Iran (AFP, 2007).

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