The ‘Social’ is Essential: Democracy and Democratization Revisited

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Abstract
This paper problematizes the value and impact of social elements of democracy and democratization. In the first part, I will examine the limits of the liberal and republican paradigms of democracy; I will propose that two social elements of democracy – societal empowerment and social justice are central to the success and consolidation of a substantive democracy. I shall examine Jurgen Habermas’s concept of “deliberative democracy” to explore the social aspects of democracy. In the second part, I will examine two major theoretical trends in the democratization literature: structural theories and the actor-centred theories. I will argue that a third alternative approach better acknowledges the social elements of democratization. This integrative approach keeps an equal distance from vulgar voluntarism and structural determinism; it successfully synthesizes dialectical relations between structure and agency, “causes” and “causers,” and social and political factors/actors. It underlines the value and impact of social movements in democratization. The conclusion argues that why and how the social is essential in the origin and success of democracy and democratization.

Introduction
Democracy is a contested concept, and the process of democratization is a complex task. Different structural and non-structural variables brought democracy to different countries at different periods of time. Different games were played by different social and political actors to achieve democracy. The purpose of this paper is to examine these contested concept and complex task. It also aims at problematizing the value and impact of the ‘social’ elements in the rise and success of democracy and democratization. In doing so, the paper will first define the meaning of democracy in the context of
democratization theories. It will then outline the genesis of democracy, or the conditions and causes conducive to democratization.

In the first part of this paper, I shall argue that political procedural liberal democracy, as introduced by Dahl and Linz, offers only a limited version of democracy. It helps to the extent that it proposes a minimal base for a transition to democracy, providing us with a practical and feasible path to begin. This version of democracy is problematic as it pays little attention to socio-cultural elements of democracy. I will argue that stability and consolidation of democracy require a substantive version of democracy in which two social elements of democracy – societal empowerment and social equality – are warranted. I shall examine Jurgen Habermas’ concept of “deliberative democracy” to explore the social aspects of democracy.

In the second part I shall examine two major theoretical trends in the literature on democratization. The first trend is structural theories, and the second is actor-centred theories. I will then sketch out an integrative and dialectical approach in which both structure and agency contribute to democratization and de-democratization. I will argue that a third alternative approach better acknowledges the social elements of democratization. This integrative approach keeps an equal distance from vulgar voluntarism and structural determinism; it successfully synthesizes dialectical relations between structure and agency, “causes” and “causers,” and social and political factors/actors. It underlines the value and impact of social movements in democratization. The conclusion will outline whether the social is essential in the origin and success of democracy and democratization.

I. Democracy: Social Elements Revisited
It is generally argued that the process of democratization is a transition from forms of totalitarianism and/or authoritarianism, to some form of democracy. But the meaning and nature of democracy have changed over time and space. John Markoff argues that in fact the history of democratization reveals the struggle over the meaning of democracy. 1 Both democracy and its meaning evolved in the process of democratization. What we now call modern democracy was often experienced as a number of separate questions. People at first did not want democracy; they demanded a less fearful and more lawful state. The first parliament in Western countries was not a legislative institution, but was a consultative body. European medieval constitutionalism was far from a modern concept of constitutionalism; it provided a legal framework to institutionalize the rule of privileged classes. For several centuries democratization meant to eliminate the multiple votes enjoyed by the privileged classes and to make the

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exclusive electoral system more inclusive, to transform a competitive electoral system based on gender, literacy, and income into a comprehensive universal suffrage. It took more than a century to consolidate the principle of universal suffrage. It took over two centuries to achieve what we currently acknowledge as modern democracy. Likewise, David Beetham argues that the gradual development of democracy is a historical fact, and to ignore this fact is to make an ahistorical argument. Theoretically, historical changes over the meaning and nature of democracy suggest that there exist a number of theories, but no single theory, of democracy. There are several forms of practicing democracy. David Collier and Steven Levitsky identify over 550 subtypes of democracy in almost 150 cases. How do we then move from such conceptual chaos? At the risk of simplification but with a merit of providing a clear classification, democratic theories can be divided into two primary groups: the maximalist and the minimalist theories. The maximalist theories offer a radical, comprehensive and substantive definition of democracy consisting not only of political rights but social, economic, gender, and cultural rights. More specifically, in this definition of democracy, popular legitimacy (origin) and democratic political arrangements (institutions) are minimum conditions of democracy; the origin and institutions of democracy are required but not sufficient factors for democracy. In addition to the origin and the institutions, radical goals and substantive outcomes are essential parts of democracy. Democratic goals and outcomes are defined in light of social, economic, cultural, transnational, and political democracy. The minimalist definition accords with the origin and the institutions of democracy. Democracy, it is argued, originates from the people and works through such institutions as constitutions, political parties and parliaments. According to Adam Przeworski, democracy is “the institutionalization of uncertainty,” and “the decisive step towards democracy is the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules.” More specifically, Joseph Schumpeter argues that democracy “means that only
the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.”

Schumpeter also suggests that because democracy originates from *demos*, it is up to the *demos* to define itself, to decide who deserves the full right of citizenship and determine who is in and who is out of democratic procedures: “Leave it to every *populous* to define himself.”

The minimalists therefore affirm procedural democracy, suggesting that democracy is a constitutional government with certain rules and procedures and uncertain results and outcomes. The Schumpeterian minimalism implies that democracies are entitled to include or exclude as many people as they decide.

This version of minimalism left a significant problem unsolved, as neither the origin, nor institution, nor rules could guarantee democratic outcomes. Almost all modern populist totalitarian regimes, not to mention authoritarian polities, claimed to rule by the people, hold some form of democratic institutions, and set some popular rules at least partially and temporally. A minimalist version of democracy encourages mass participation and endorses majority rule. But this minimalism has often reduced citizens to masses, and has also degenerated competitive participation to mass mobilization. Empirical evidence suggests that democratic procedures have often been instrumental in redefining democratic principles, ignoring human rights, and violating minority rights. Formal democratic procedures were instrumental in redefining the *populous*. Under such procedures the citizenship was redefined and reduced to believers, as defined by the state authorities. The state implicitly created an insider/outsider dichotomy to redefine the concept of citizenship. Likewise, democratic institutions were easily transformed from a mechanism of choice into a mere device of mass mobilization. As such, the very source and institutions of democracy could turn into the anti-thesis of democracy.

In his seminal work, *Polyarchy*, Robert Dahl advanced the Schumpeterian version of minimal democracy. Although Dahl remained a minimalist, he set two more qualitative criteria for the minimalist procedural definition of democracy. “What we think of democratization,” Dahl suggests, are “made up of at least two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate.”

For Dahl, “public contestation” would elevate procedural democracy from a mere electoral democracy with the people’s “right to participate,” to a polity responsive to the right of “public opposition” and committed to the rights of minorities. Implicit in Dahl’s argument is that the right of participation should guarantee the right of inclusive citizenship. Democracy requires inclusive institutions and fair procedures through which all citizens can compete and express their free choice. For Dahl, competition and participation would guarantee the inclusiveness

2. Ibid, pp. 244-245.
and would save a political system from the ill-effects of electoral democracy. In *Democracy and Its Critics*, Dahl suggests that modern democracy or, to use his own concept, *polyarchy* holds two characteristics. First, a relatively high proportion of adults hold the rights of citizenship; second, citizens can oppose the political system. The first characteristic differentiates modern democracy from the exclusive polities of early twentieth century Europe, in which only a small portion of the elites were defined as the people. The second distinguishes modern democracy from modern authoritarian regimes in which citizenship does not hold the legal right to oppose the system.\(^1\)

Second only to Robert Dahl, as James Mahoney put it, Juan Linz “was a major founder of the procedural and minimal definition of democracy.”\(^2\) According to Linz, democracy consists of the legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to associations, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and non-violent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the community, without their political preference.\(^3\)

In the same line of argument Charles Tilly suggests that democracies establish “fairly general and reliable rules of law” instead of the “massive asymmetry, coercion, exploitation, patronage, and communal segmentation that have characterized most political regimes.”\(^4\) In McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s view, “working definitions of democracy divide into three overlapping categories: *sustentative* criteria emphasising qualities of human experience and social ties; *constitutional* criteria emphasising legal procedures such as elections and referenda; *political-process* criteria emphasising interactions among politically constituted actors.”\(^5\) Democracy, they argue, “maintains broad citizenship, equal and autonomous citizenship, binding consultation of citizens at large...as well as protection of citizens from arbitrary actions by governmental agents.”\(^6\) Hence, Tilly argues that democratization means “featuring relatively broad and equal citizenship” which protects “citizens from arbitrary actions by governmental agents.”\(^7\)

The “*political-process*” criteria concur with the Dahl-Linzian procedural minimal democracy, which simultaneously insists on elements of electoral democracy,

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6. Ibid.
principles of pluralism and citizenship, and fundamental political rights. This notion transcends the Schumpeterian model of electoral democracy to a substantive, and yet minimal, definition of democracy. Hence, the Dahl-Linzian procedural, political concept of democracy offers a minimal version of democracy. This minimalist position needs further clarification: first, there is an intense debate in the literature about the transferability of such procedural, political, liberal democracy and consider it neither ideal nor universal democracy. Second, the success, stability, and consolidation of democracy need to incorporate social elements into the minimal, political concept of democracy. Democracy in the “Lincolnian” definition is about the rule of people, by the people and for the people, and social elements of democracy gives agency to the people. To this end, I define social elements of democracy in two specific terms: societal empowerment and social equality. In the following section I will problematize both liberal and republican versions of democracy and argue for the usefulness of deliberative democracy. Third, it is absolutely necessary to make a clear distinction between the minimalist and maximalist definition of democracy when we examine democratization in the global South. There is a strong tendency toward maximalism in the political culture of some political opposition—a negative utopianism and/or a religious or secular Messianic culture. Maximalism as such has ironically produced two seemingly opposing approaches: political apathy and blind radicalism. It has deprived gradual change. History teaches us we can begin with minimal achievements while keeping in mind that the goal remains far further than this minimalism.

Societal empowerment and democracy
Societal empowerment is about strengthening civil society and establishing democratic procedures based on engagement, dialogue and deliberation of civil society. Jurgen Habermas’s concept of “deliberative democracy” focuses on this societal aspect, as opposed to a merely political notion of democracy. In “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” he introduces a new procedural and deliberative concept of democracy where politics is about deliberation of civil society and democracy aims at the “institutionalization of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens.”

1. See footnote 5 for a list of radical alternative theories of democracy. Also, see a critical examination of modernization theories on the following pages.
Deliberative democracy, Habermas argues, “differs in relevant aspects from both the liberal and the republican paradigm.” In classical liberalism, society is perceived as a “market-structured network of interactions among private persons.” Politics is the function of “pushing private interests against a government apparatus.” By contrast, in the republican tradition as set by Rousseau and Hannah Arndt, Habermas argues, “politics is conceived as the reflective form of substantial ethical life.” Put simply, the liberal and the republican paradigm differ on the concept of citizenry. On the classical-liberal view, “the citizen’s status is determined by primarily according to negative rights they have vis-à-vis the state and other citizens.” Citizens enjoy their “private interests”, which are finally “aggregated into political will that makes an impact on the administration.” On the republican view, citizens are not “private persons”; they are “politically autonomous authors of a community of free and equal persons.” On this view, Habermas argues, “free and equal citizens reach an understanding on which goals and norms lie in the equal interest of all;” citizens hold positive rights – “pre-eminently rights of political participation and communication.” In other words, the classical-liberal and republican models accept a state-centred model of democracy; they both “presuppose a view of society as centred in the state – be it the state as guardian of a market-society or the state as the self-conscious institutionalization of an ethical community.”

The two paradigms also differ on the “nature of the political process.” In the liberal view, Habermas observes, “success is measured by the citizen’s approval, quantified as votes, of persons and programs.” The political process is built on a “success-oriented attitude.” The voting preference, he argues, “has the same structure as the acts of choice made by participants in a market.” In the republican view, “the paradigm is not the market but dialogue. This dialogic conception imagines politics as contestation of values and not simply questions of preference.” This idealism of the republican view, Habermas indicates, implies that “the democratic process is dependent on the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal.” This Rousseauian democratic tradition assumes that there is a prior collective socio-ethical bond – common good –

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2. Ibid, italics added.
3. Ibid, p. 22
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, p. 26
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, p. 24
which guides citizens’ behaviours. “The unanimity of the political legislature” is secured in advance by a “substantive ethical consensus.”

By contrast, in deliberative democracy, writes Habermas, “democratic will-formation draws its legitimating force not from a previous convergence of settled ethical convictions but from the communicative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into play in various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that secure fair bargaining.” Hence, deliberative democracy holds elements of dialogue and procedural politics. It differs from classical liberalism since it places more emphasis on societal dialogue and deliberation, and it differs from the republican view as it advances procedural politics rather than a collective prior ethical concept of politics.

In classical liberalism, society is apolitical and people are de-politicized; this model, Habermas argues, “hinges not on the democratic self-determination of deliberating citizens but on the legal institutionalization of an economic society that is supposed to guarantee an essentially non-political common good by the satisfaction of private preferences.” In the republican model, society is “from the very start, political society,” and democracy is “equivalent to the political self-organization of society as a whole.” But in deliberative democracy the “normative content arises from the very structure of communicative action.” This notion of democracy depends not on “a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication.” Deliberative democracy subscribes neither to the liberal notion of apolitical private citizen nor to the republican view of a collective political society.

In classical liberalism “the rule of law is applied to many isolated private subjects,” while in the republican view citizens are collective actors who reflect and act for the whole society. In deliberative democracy, as in the liberal model, “the boundaries between ‘state’ and ‘society’ are respected; but in this sense, civil society provides the social basis of autonomous public spheres that remain as distinct from the economic system as from the administration.” This implies that civil society “should gain the strength to hold its own against the two other mechanisms of social integration – money and administrative power.”

In the liberal model, the function of democratic will-formation is merely legitimating power; in the republican model, the function of democratic will-formation

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid
4. Ibid, p. 26
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, p. 28
7. Ibid, italic added.
constitutes society as a political community. But in deliberative democracy, the function is more than legitimation and less than the constitution of power. The administrative structure provides a system for “collectively binding decisions,” while the communicative structure of the public sphere provides a societal network, which reacts to and reflects public opinion.\textsuperscript{1} 

In the republican model, the whole is a sovereign citizenry; in the liberal model, the whole is a constitution, which guarantees the rule of law and liberal values. Deliberative democracy is instead a “de-centered society” where power “springs from the interactions between legally institutionalized will-formation and culturally mobilized public.”\textsuperscript{2} Deliberative democracy provides a medium for a “conscious integration of the legal community.”\textsuperscript{3} It works with “the higher-level inter-subjectivity of communication processes that flow through both parliamentary bodies and the informal networks of the public sphere.”\textsuperscript{4} Habermas’s procedural concept of deliberative democracy, in sum, aims “to bring universalistic principles of justice into the horizon of the specific form of life of a particular community.”\textsuperscript{5} In his lecture presented at the Holberg Prize Seminar, Habermas argued that “the content of political decisions that can be enforced by the state must be formulated in a language that is accessible to all citizens and it must be possible to justify them in this language.”\textsuperscript{6} To this end, it places civil society in the centre by empowering the forces of civil society and acknowledging the role of agency in socio-political change; it keeps distance from an elitist conception of politics where civil society remains apolitical and immobilized. The elitist conception of politics has resulted in the institutional weakness of democrats across the history. The repressive nature of the state has certainly reduced the opportunity for elites and intellectuals to convey their democratic message to their own people. More importantly, however, it has been the lack of language accessible to the common people, which place some obstacle in communicating with public. This brings us to the significance and relevance of culture, religion included, for democratization.

**Societal empowerment and religion: Civil public religion**

According to Jurgen Habermas, modernity is an “unfinished project.” Similarly, some social theories suggest that “‘tradition’ is likewise a perpetually unfinished project – that is how people understand their traditions and apply them to practical situation.”\textsuperscript{7} The

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 30
4. Ibid, p. 28
5. Ibid, p. 25
notion of an unfinished project of tradition implies that tradition and change are not mutually exclusive concepts, and there is instead a constant and critical dialogue between tradition and modernity, and religion and democracy. A discursive dialogue with culture, and mining the tradition could show that modern values such as freedom, democracy, and justice are universal and have native roots in the intellectual soil of every society. A dialogue with people’s traditions and cultures empowers civil society, facilitates active and deliberative engagement, and provides the most effective path to challenge the status quo. It brings about change from within.

When autocratic regimes utilize non-democratic religious discourses to legitimize their rule, democratic interpretations of religion and tradition in the public sphere are vital to the success of democratization.¹ The autocratic version of religion can best be overcome by a democratic religion. To this end, a public expression of democratic religion can defeat autocratic religion. When the polity appeals to religious doctrines and the society remains a relatively religious one, a private and isolated religion, as classic-liberalism wants us to believe, will not serve democratization. In such a condition, Abdullahi An-Na’im reminds us that democrats must not “abandon” the public field to the autocrats who manipulate religion for their own political purpose.² Traditions, religions included, are unfinished projects and able to accommodate with modern normative values. Hence, a civil public religion can provide a viable alternative to the autocratic political religion, since it communicates with the people’s language and facilitates their active participation in politics. A civil public religion is an alternative from within religious traditions, which following Habermas’ line of reasoning, aims at “a reconstruction of sacred truths that is compelling for people of faith in light of modern living conditions for which no alternatives any longer exist.”³

Civil public religion is not a political religion institutionalized in the state structure and, therefore, can live with democracy. A democratic state, Habermas argues, “must not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and politics into an undue mental and psychological burden for all those citizens who follow a faith.”⁴ A democratic state must not also expect believers “to split their identity in public and private components as long as they participate in public debates and contribute to the formation of public opinions.”⁵ Habermas goes even further and suggests that under

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³. Habermas, “Religion in the public sphere,” p. 10. A public civil religion, as I interpret it, differs from a state-sponsored religion. The former does appreciate legal impediments in the political process to prevent autocratic religious interpretations from undermining the overarching principles of democracy, including the separation of religious institutions and state.
certain conditions “the secular citizens must open their minds,” in order to learn from “the normative truth content of a religious expression” and enter into “dialogue” with their fellow religious citizens. Such a dialogue serves societal empowerment, and thus the success and stability of democracy.

**Social justice and democracy**

The second social element of democracy is social justice. Democracy, to use Michael Walzer’s argument, requires not only an open and inclusive political society, but also an open and inclusive economic society. According to Walzer, “the members of political society and economic society are collectively responsible for each other’s welfare.” Workers and other citizens, “have claims, always partial, on the resources of the whole society.” More specifically, “economic power,” Walzer argues, “should be shared by the same people who share political power.” This principle, he argues, “by no means rules out market relations; it only rules out what might be called market imperialism – the conversion of private wealth into political influence and social privilege.” It is only with both political and economic openness and equality that we would have a “society of lively, energetic, active, component people shaping their common life.” Social equality gives meaning and substance to political democracy; it makes the value of democratic ideas tangible to the public. Social inequality results in a gradual decline of democratic aspirations in civil society; it gives rise to populist-authoritarian trends and pushes democratic ideas and institutions at bay. “Poverty,” as Przeworski et. al observes, “can trap societies in its grip” and “breeds dictatorships.” The history and current socio-political dynamics of the global South provides evidence for a negative correlation between democratic aspiration and social inequality.

II. Democratization: Dialectics of the Social and Political?

Like theories of democracy, democratization theories have changed over time and context; they have reflected the development of society and state in different socio-historical contexts. The first generation of democratization theories adopted a structuralist account, while the second generation holds a voluntarist approach. I will examine major structural theories such as modernization theories, Barrington Moore’s school of historical sociology, the dependency and world system theories, and the “three power structure” introduced by Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens. I will then look

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1. Ibid.
2. Walzer argues “Communism has given socialism a bad name.” See Michael Walzer, “A Credo for This Moment,” in Dissent 37 (Spring 1990): no. 2, p. 160
3. Ibid.
4. There is a complex relation between democracy and development. The economic effects of political instability and the impact of political regimes on the growth of total income differ across countries. For a successful effort on this issue, see Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Development and Democracy: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 270, 277.
at the actor-centred school or voluntarism, political conditions, different paths towards
democratic transitions, and the role of civil society and social movements in
democratization. Finally, I will argue that the third trend of democratization theories,
successfully synthesizes structuralism and voluntarism; it underlines the value and
impact of social movements in democratization.

The Structural Account
The structuralist theories of democratization are often identified with “modernization”
theories and Barrington Moore’s school of “historical sociology.” Although not
specifically theories of democratization, the “dependency” and “world-system” theories
are also classified as structuralist theories of social change.

Modernization theories
The classical modernization theories were developed in the late 1950s. These theories
perceived social change as a progressive and irreversible process with a universal and
linear path. The route to democracy, it was argued, corresponds to the Western path
taken from tradition to modernity. Tradition and modernity, Walt Rostow argued, are
mutually exclusive concepts; modernization is associated with westernization, while
modernity broadly consists of urbanization, industrialization, secularization, and
eventually, democratization.1 This generation of modernization theories examined the
rise of the first democracies in the West in general, and Britain in particular, where
structural factors played a major role in democratization. Hence, much attention was
paid to factors such as the Industrial Revolution, the rise and crisis of capitalism,
international and civil wars, and class compromises and class conflict.2 On this view,
democratization was driven by structural pressures, not elite decisions. Seymour Martin
Lipset, a towering figure of this generation, argued that democracy is not a choice; it is a
natural result of economic modernization. Development and democracy, he argued, go
hand in hand: economic development contributes to the growth of a middle class and a
large middle class “is able to reward moderate and democratic parties.”3 A strong
capitalism and independent bourgeoisie results in democracy; the more well-to-do a
nation, so the argument goes, the greater the chances it can sustain democracy.

But the consolidation of authoritarian politics and the complex picture of
development in most developing countries raised serious doubts about the universal

1. See Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) and
3. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, (1959), pp. 53, 83. This school owes much to the works of scholars such as Walt Rostow, Lucian Pye, Almond Verba, Talcott Parsons,
and recently, Larry Diamond, and A. Leftwich.
application of classical-modernization theories. Hence the new generation of modernization theories developed since the late 1970’s; they revised and modified the assumptions of the first generation of modernization theorists. Samuel Huntington and, to a lesser degree, Larry Diamond admitted that there is no universal positive correlation between development and democracy. Unlike the classical theorists, they admitted that internal factors alone, that is the internal dynamics of state and society, cannot explain the rise or the crisis of development and democracy. External factors such as the impact of the international community and democratic diffusion in neighboring counties are conducive to democratization.\(^1\) Samuel Huntington explicitly rejected the universal application of Western democratic rule, boldly challenging the idea that non-Western civilizations would follow the Western path of liberal democracy. Islamic and Confucian civilizations in particular, he argued, are inherently incompatible with liberal democracy.\(^2\) On this view, democracy is not only Western in origin but also uniquely suited to Occidental culture. Hence, the absence of democracy in the Muslim world is the fact of “Muslim Exceptionalism.” Ernest Gellner argues that Muslim societies are essentially different than others, in that “no secularization has taken place in the world of Islam.”\(^3\) In *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, he argues that Islam has been exceptionally immune to the forces of secularization.\(^4\) By the same token, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington maintain that Western culture is unique and essentially different from other civilizations and in particular from Islam.\(^5\) The inevitable fusion of religion and politics, Bernard Lewis argues, is something that historically and intellectually attaches to Islam.\(^6\) According to Huntington, while “in Islam, God is Caesar,” in the West “God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual and temporal authority, have been a prevailing dualism.”\(^7\) For Huntington, it is not “Islamic fundamentalism” but the “fundamental” essence of Islam that makes it incompatible with modernity and democracy. Huntington’s essentialist argument implies that democracy is an achievement of Western civilization, and therefore not easily transferable to other civilizations.\(^8\) Thus, the “Islamic mind” and democracy are mutually exclusive. But Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid argues that


\(^7\) Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World*, p. 70.

to speak about an ‘Islamic Mind’ in abstraction from all constrains of geography and history, and in isolation from the social and cultural conditioning of Islamic societies, can only leads us into unrealistic, even metaphysical, speculations. Instead, it is more realistic to look for the root of this panic reaction to critique in the crisis of modernization and complicated relationship between the Islamic world and the West.

Fred Halliday suggests that “there is nothing specifically ‘Islamic’ about” obstacles that hinder democracy in the Muslim societies, though some of these obstacles “tend to be legitimized in terms of Islamic doctrine.” Any argument about incompatibility or compatibility between Islam and democracy adopts “the false premise that there is one true, traditionally established ‘Islamic’ answer to the question, and this timeless ‘Islam’ rules social and political practices. There is no such answer and no such ‘Islam’.”

For Halliday, Islam is so broad that it is possible to catch almost any fish one wants. It is, like all the great religions, a reservoir of values, symbols and ideas from which it is possible to derive a contemporary politics and social code: the answer as to why this or that interpretation was put upon Islam resides therefore, not in the religion and its text itself, but in the contemporary needs of those articulating Islamic politics.

Similarly, Talal Asad suggests that both Western Orientalists and Islamist share “the idea that Islam was originally – and therefore essentially – a theocratic state;” but, for the Islamists, “this history constituted the betrayal of a sacred ideal that Muslims are required as believers to restore;” and for the Orientalists, “it defines a schizophrenic compromise that has always prevented a progressive reform of Islam.” Thus the Islamic state is not as much a product of some Islamic essence as “it is the product of modern politics and the modernizing state.” The modern construction of reality created the discourse of Islamism. “The essentialist construction of Islam was thoroughly modern in the sense that modernity demanded an essentialist standardization of the world.”

According to Norris and Inglehart, the data and empirical evidence suggest that “when political attitudes are compared far from a clash of values, there is a minimal

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5. Ibid, pp. 190-191.
6. Ibid, p. 190
difference between the Muslim world and the West”¹ and they are “similar in their positive orientation toward democratic ideals.”² More importantly, “support for democracy is surprisingly whispered among Islamic publics, even among those who live in authoritarian societies.”³ The empirical evidence, as Norris and Inglehart argue, urges “strong caution in generalizing from the type of regime to the state of public opinion.”⁴ Authoritarian regimes, Islamist or otherwise, do not represent the state of Muslims’ public opinion.

Huntington’s colleague, Francis Fukuyama revived some old assumptions in a new and novel discourse. We have arrived, Francis Fukuyama argued, at the “End of History”, and the “Last Man” has been born in Western liberal democracy. Non-Western countries will be joining the West due to the worldwide structural force of modernization.⁵ His argument implies that the path to this “End” is both unique and universal. It is unique because there is no democratic alternative path except the Western one; it is universal because liberal democracy is the desirable model across the globe. The spread of economic and cultural globalization contributes to the universal acceptance of liberal democracy.

Modernization theories still believe in a dichotomy between tradition and modernity, and subscribe to a Western-centric approach. The pessimist Huntington suggests that non-Western civilizations are incapable of democratization and must be left alone. The optimist Fukuyama argues that non-Western cultures and traditions are short of internal dynamism for democratization, but capable of adapting Western liberal democracy. Hence, they both assume that the West is the best, non-Western traditions are inhospitable to democracy, and the path to democratization remains particular.

Dependency and World-system theories
The predicament of development and the democratic deficit in the global South, and the lack of compelling explanations on the part of modernization theories, contributed to the rise of a new set of radical theories of social change: dependency and world-system theories. Andre Gunder Frank, one of the founding fathers of dependency theories, argued that the world is divided into two categories: the North “metropolis” and the South “satellite.” The colonial legacy and unequal international structures have created conditions in which the satellite remains highly dependent upon the metropolis. Development of the North has caused underdevelopment of the South. The fate and future of development in the global South, so the argument goes, depends on external

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3. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular, p.155
4. Ibid
factors. It is not the backward local traditions that hindered development; but instead the inferior position of the satellite states in the global structure and their economic dependency. Development and dependency, Frank argued, are mutually exclusive.¹ Fernando Cardoso revised Frank’s radical and pessimistic view. Dependency and capitalist development, Cardoso argued, are compatible. The satellites are capable of capitalist development, but this so-called “dependent capitalist development” remains incompatible with democracy. The “dependent capitalist development” increased the size of the middle class and strengthened the power of the military in Latin America. But the internal dynamics of class struggle and the global structure of power, he argued, turned the middle class and the military into two internal pillars of authoritarianism.² Likewise, Guillermo O’Donnell offered the same line of argument in explaining the complex process of development and democratization in Latin America. In the early 1970’s, a number of relatively modernized countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay fell into a new type of authoritarian regime: “bureaucratic authoritarian” states. The rise of the “bureaucratic authoritarian” regimes, O’Donnell argued, was due to a combination of the internal class factor (the coalition of the urban middle class and the military-civilian elites), and the external factor (the position of these states in the global economic structure). According to O’Donnell, economic modernization in general and the policy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in particular, increased the size of the middle class. Like its military partner, this class favoured authoritarianism, not democracy. The ISI policy and the international market economy, O’Donnell argued, contributed to this authoritarian tendency. The global decline in the demands and prices of Latin American primary exports caused internal economic stagnation; the economic disaster brought public protests and demands for higher wages, while a new economic policy required freezing the labour wage. The coalition of the middle class and the elites believed that political opening and democracy would jeopardize this new policy of intensive industrialization. It was in this context that the middle class and the elites turned into the twin pillars of “bureaucratic authoritarian regimes.”³ The argument put forward by Cardoso and O’Donnell implies that although “dependent capitalist development” contributes to the greater size of the middle class; it is more likely to generate authoritarianism, not democracy. More importantly, the empirical evidence suggests that the middle class lacks a historical mission to support a transition to democracy; it may or may not side with the politics of democratization. In countries

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under “dependent capitalist development”, the middle class often sides with authoritarian trends.

Like dependency theorists, Immanuel Wallerstein believed that “to understand the internal class contradictions and political struggles of a particular state, we must first situate it in the world-economy.”¹ This would help us to understand the interests of “particular groups located within a particular state.”² Unlike the first generation of the dependency school, Immanuel Wallerstein believed that the “world system” is no longer polarized, but instead divided into three zones of “core, periphery, and semi-periphery,” and the existence of the semi-periphery points to the greater possibility of development in the world system. Although Wallerstein never discussed the correlation between the state position in the world system and democratization, his theory implies that the world system plays a part in the type of political regime. Given its high level of industrialization, the core enjoys a strong and autonomous middle class contributing to its democratic politics. The core needs cheap raw materials and a large market available in the non-core; in return, the corrupt autocratic elites in the non-core receive the core’s economic and political support. The export of raw materials and the import of manufacturing goods – mercantilist capitalism – often undermine the growth of an urban, industrialized middle class in the non-core. The alliance between the elites in the non-core (periphery or semi-periphery) and the elites in the core weakens the position of the middle class in the non-core (periphery or semi-periphery). Hence, the world system could jeopardize the growth of the middle class and the rise of democratic politics in the periphery/semi-periphery.

Barrington Moore’s historical-structuralism

In his classic work, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore introduced a new structural approach in the study of social change and regime transition.³ Moore’s methodology of “historical-structural sociology” sharply differed from the universal, linear approach of modernization theories. Modernization and industrialization, Moore argued, would not necessarily lead to a universal progressive outcome. Routes to modernity vary, and thus democracy may or may not evolve at the end of the road. Three types of political regimes, Moore argued, are the end stations of three different paths. These paths are determined by a complex class coalition between the landlords, the peasantry, and the urban bourgeoisie. A bourgeois revolution leads to capitalist democracy (the United States, England, and France); an abortive bourgeois

² Ibid
revolution/conservative revolution leads to fascism (Japan and Germany); and a peasantry revolution leads to communism (Russia and China). Moore’s structural approach suggests that the choice for democracy is restricted by socio-political structures of power, and a particular class coalition determines the type of political regime. In fascist and communist regimes a relatively weak urban bourgeoisie and the coalition of the centralized state and the powerful landlord class ruled out any democratic outcomes. Democracy, Moore argued, requires a strong urban bourgeoisie and weak landlord class; it needs a bourgeois revolution. In Moore’s own words, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.”

Moore’s structural-historical account implies that class structure and the path taken by the social classes in the past determine the future path of democratization. Decisions and/or coalitions made in the past are irreversible; an abortive bourgeois revolution, for instance, would not lead to democracy. Countries cannot escape their own history. Moore’s approach is helpful in examining structural-historical difficulties in the path of democratization. It fails, however, to explain why and how democracy emerged in countries in the third wave of democratization with a long history of authoritarian and totalitarian traditions and no record of bourgeois revolution in the past.

Moore’s structural-historical approach takes a complex and multi-faceted position with respect to the historical mission of class. Like Max Weber and Otto Hintze, Barrington Moore distanced himself from a universalist-linear approach. He adopts a particularistic approach with respect to the role of class in social change, which implies that the path for development and democracy is neither linear (modernization theories) nor staged (Marxist theory). Moore’s theory adapts a particularistic and class-collective approach. It is a particularistic approach since it suggests that no class holds a universal historical mission in favour of or against development and democracy. Social classes are not entirely driven by their historical interests; they make different coalitions in different historical contexts. Moore’s view adapts a class-collective approach, as it gives more attention to the position of a particular class in the class coalition. The urban bourgeoisie was part of a class coalition both in the democratic and fascist revolutions in Europe. In the former, the participation of the bourgeoisie led to democracy because the bourgeoisie dominated the class coalition. In the latter, the bourgeoisie was subordinated to the state and the landlords. Likewise, the British aristocrats were part of the class coalition leading up to the establishment of a parliamentary democracy.

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Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens approach: “Three power structure”
Like Barrington Moore’s particularistic approach, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens in *Capitalist Development and Democracy* argue that capitalist development may lead to democracy under a particular class structure. Unlike Moore, however, they make it clear that “it was not capitalist market nor capitalists as the new dominant force, but rather the contradiction of capitalism that advanced the causes of democracy.”¹ It was against this background that they claim the working class, not the urban bourgeoisie, has been the major promoter of democratization since the British Chartism movement. The urban bourgeoisie, they argued, has played an ambiguous role as it has fought only for its own inclusion in the political process and has occasionally opposed the inclusion of the under-classes. The urban bourgeoisie, they observe, served as a junior member of the state-landlords alliance that brought totalitarianism into power in post-First World War Germany, Italy, Austria, and Spain. Hence, the urban bourgeoisie can serve as a social origin of dictatorship; only a class structure with the leadership of the working class can lead to democracy.²

Critics have raised a few concerns with respect to Rueschemeyer et al’s account of the unique role of the working class in democratization. According to Ruth Berins Collier, like every social class, the working class can be what it wants to be; class action is not determined by a historical mission. In Europe, Collier argues, the working class played a complex role in the politics of democratization, and was an active partner of the middle class in the process of democratization from below. This class, however, played a marginal role in the politics of democratization from above where the power-holders were looking for a new basis of legitimacy through revolts, coups, and mass mobilization. The working class played a key role in the earlier stage of democratization, and a marginal role in the current episode.³

Despite its shortcomings, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* takes a significant step in the development of Moore’s structural-historical tradition; they begin where Moore left off. Moore paid little attention to the impact of the structure of the state and the transnational power structure. But Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens introduce a “three power structures” model in which societal change is determined by the interaction of three independent factors: class, state and transnational power structures.⁴

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2. Ibid. pp. 5-6.
The model is rich and helpful for the following reasons: *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, in spite of all its limitations, has successfully synthesized three rival theories of social change: modernization theories, dependency/world system theories, and Moore’s structural-historical approach. It provides us with a wide-ranging structural argument that takes into account the interaction of internal and external structures, and social (class) and political (state) factors. Rueschemeyer, Stephans and Stephans reject both the optimism of modernization theories (linear-universalism), and the pessimism of dependency/world system theories (negative correlations between dependency on the one hand and development and democracy on the other). They follow Moore’s particularistic tradition in which a positive correlation exists between capitalist development and democracy only under particular class structures. They advance Moore’s historical-structural tradition by including two more structural factors: the state and transnational power. The success of development and democracy depend on the complex interactions between three power structures of class, state and transnational power.¹ Yet like most structural accounts, *Capitalist development and Democracy* pays little attention to the role of political agency in social change and regime transformation. This brings us to the following section, where I will examine the rise of the second generation of democratization theories: the voluntarist theories.

**Voluntarism: Actor-centred approach**

The practice of post-1970’s democratic transitions led to the rise of the second generation of democratization theories and shifted the focus from structuralism to voluntarism. This theoretical turn was due to the new practice of contemporary democratization in which democracy evolved in countries without the presence of all the structural conditions required for democratic transition. The new generation of democratization theorists argued that political agency can make a significant difference, given the absence of the required level of development and immaturity of capitalism, the ineffectiveness of class coalitions, and the effective acts of individual elites in recent democratic transitions. The actor-centred school, Adam Przeworski argues, was a reaction to the mechanistic approach of the early modernization theories in which individual roles remained unnoticed.² The school was a strong calling for the role of wise politicians to by-pass all structural obstacles in the transition to democracy. These theorists, identified as the “transitologists,” give more credit to individual agency, leadership skills, and the choice and strategies of political elites in democratic transition.

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The transition period, they argue, is a moment of political uncertainty in which countries can escape their past and transform the present into an uncertain future. Democratic transition is a political game. All that is needed is a group of wise political elites who know what, when, and how to act.¹ Democracy, Doh Shin argued, “is no longer treated as a particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be transplanted in alien soil; it is treated as a product that can be manufactured wherever there is democratic craftsmanship and the proper zeitgeist.”² Transition to democracy is bound, to use O’Donnell and Schmitter’s concept, by “structuralist indeterminacy”, and the elite’s strategic choice would determine the outcomes.³

The voluntarism of the transitologists is a reductionist approach for two reasons: first, Jean Grugel observes that it “does not explain adequately why outcomes are different, except by presuming inadequate leadership styles or the adoption of incorrect policies.” In other words, “when democratizations go wrong it is, by implication, because individuals ‘get it wrong.’”⁴ This approach reduces the success or failure of democratic transition to some psychological factors and renders structures irrelevant. Second, it underestimates the role of civil society, as a strong and active civil society, transitologists argue, may or may not serve democratization. The transitologists admit that the Solidarity Movement in Poland, the student movement in South Korea, and mass mobilization or, to use O’Donnell and Schmitter’s concept, the “resurrection of civil society”⁵ in the Philippines, Argentina, and Chile were conducive to the politics of democratization. But civil society movement is helpful as long as it is controlled by the elites. A strong and independent civil society, T. L. Karl observes, could hinder a successful democratic transition since the acts of civil society are not consistently predictable. The regime hardliners are likely to jeopardize the process of democratization if the demands of civil society exceed the capability of the regime’s softliners.⁶ To the transitologists, the primary actors are individual elites, and civil society is of secondary importance. This reductionist assumption ignores the fact that the success of democratic transition, as John Markoff observes, depends on the interaction between social movements (civil society actors) and the elite reformists.⁷

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³. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, p.49


The pressure from below (civil society) provides invaluable soft power to be used in the negotiation from above (the negotiation of softliners with hardliners). Last but not least, in non-democratic countries where democratic institutions are weak, civil society organizations could serve as multifunctional organs. They could educate and also aggregate the citizens’ interests where party politics is weak. Iran’s third wave, as will be discussed in this study, provides evidence regarding the significance of civil society.

**Structuralism vs. Voluntarism**

Structuralism and voluntarism differ in two fundamental ways: first, conceptually they hold different views on the notion of structure and agency. Second, practically, they pursue different strategies for democratization. Conceptually, the structuralists, Mahoney and Snyder argue, view structures as “generative forces that define actors’ interests and directly determine their behaviour.”

The voluntarists do not deny the existence of structures, but view them as “barriers external to actors which may or may not stand between them.” Actors, they argue, “pre-exist structures in that they have interests and identities prior to encountering structural constraints.” Hence, there exist historical momentums like those of transitional periods where human agency is capable of transforming macro-structural obstacles into opportunities. During regime transitions, O’Donnell and Schmitter argue, structures are “looser” and “their impacts more indeterminate, than in normal circumstances.”

According to the structuralists, the interests and identity of human agency are determined and defined by its position within the social structure. The structuralists do not deny the importance of human agency, but for them human agency is a “collective” concept; agencies such as class or state act not individually but collectively. “At the core of structuralism,” James Mahoney argues, “is the concern with analyzing objective relationships between groups and societies. Structuralism holds that configurations of social relations shape, constrain, and empower actors in predictable ways.” In contrast, the voluntarists perceive the interests and identity of human agency as external to the “objective” social structures. During regime transitions, O’Donnell and Schmitter argue, “it is almost impossible to specify which classes, sectors, institutions, and other groups will take what role, opt for what issues or support what alternative.” One therefore

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
should not, they argue, “rely on relatively stable economic, social, cultural, and partisan categories to identify, analyze, and evaluate identities and strategies of those defending the status quo and those struggling to reform or transform it.”

To the voluntarists, human agency, write Mahoney and Snyder, is “the consequence of actors’ subjective evaluations of uncertain objective conditions.” These subjective goals “may or may not correspond to their ‘objective’ socioeconomic positions.” It is these subjective goals, O’Donnell and Schmitter argue, which divide human actors into regime hardliners and softliners, and the radical and moderate opposition. It is within this concept of structure and agency that democratic transition, writes O’Donnell and Schmitter, is nothing more than a “contingent institutional compromise.” This argument implies that the actors’ subjective evaluations may or may not fit democratic norms, but objective conditions could push them to side with democratic movements. The regime softliners may or may not have strong commitments to democratic values; all they need to do is to persuade the hardliners that there is more to gain from compromise than conflict with democratic movements.

Each regime transition is unique, since human agency remains unique and distinctive. Each regime transition, it is argued, could hardly fall into universal conditions determined by worldwide structural factors. In other words, regime transitions are times of uncertainty as structures no longer function effectively; on this momentum when almost anything is possible, talented individuals can play a unique role in regime transition. During the uncertainty of regime transition, Karl and Schmitter argue, “outcomes depend less on objective conditions…than on subjective evaluations surrounding unique strategic choices.”

Next to the conceptual difference over the definition and the function of structure and agency, voluntarism and structuralism differ on the practice of democratization. Different theoretical approaches result in opposite views on the strategies and tools required for regime transition. Structuralism advances a social strategy aiming at creating social conditions conducive to democratization. It pushes for a greater distribution of economic, intellectual and other social power resources. It relies heavily

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1. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, p.4, quoted in Mahoney and Snyder, “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change,” p. 2
2. Mahoney and Snyder, “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change,” p. 3.
3. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, pp. 15-17, quoted in Mahoney and Snyder, “Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change,” p. 3.
on the role of social agents such as a strong middle class or organized working classes. Voluntarism, by contrast, emphasises political factors such as leadership and political institution. The goal in this strategy, Tatu Vanhanen argues, is to adapt “political institutions to their social environment in such a way that it becomes easier for competing groups to share power and institutionalize the sharing of power.”

**Political conditions for a successful democratic transition: “the four-player game”**

The political strategy of voluntarism is a game transition whose outcome is determined by the position of political elites and opposition. Transition to democracy, Alfred Stepan argues, is “in game theoretical terms a four-player game involving ‘regime moderates’, ‘regime hardliners’, ‘opposition moderates’, and ‘opposition hardliners.’” The regime hardliners protect the status quo while the regime softliners encourage change; they are eager to cooperate with the opposition moderates toward democratic transition. The opposition moderates are willing to cooperate with the regime softliners, while the opposition hardliners are reluctant to compromise; they view the entire regime as illegitimate and make no distinction between the regime hardliners and softliners.

A successful democratic transition depends largely on the vulnerability of both the regime and the opposition hardliners. It also equally depends on the strength of either the regime or opposition moderates. Transition games in non-democratic contexts, Alfred Stepan argues, can be “full four-player pacts” if two conditions are satisfied:

The moderate players in the regime must have sufficient autonomy so that they can, over time, conduct strategic as well as tactical negotiations with the players from the moderate opposition. Likewise, the moderates in the opposition need a degree of continued organizational presence, power and followers in the polity to play their part in the negotiation pacts.

Not every non-democratic regime is easily capable of democratic transition. The four most common ideal-types of non-democratic regimes, Stepan suggests, are “sultanistic regimes”, “totalitarian regimes”, “weakened authoritarian regimes”, and “mature post-totalitarian regimes.” Of the four, only the latter two regimes meet the conditions required for a four-player game transition: the “weakened authoritarian regimes” such as Spain and Brazil in the mid-1970s and the “‘mature’ post-totalitarian regime” of Hungary in 1988-9 and the communist authoritarian-military regime of

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3. Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*, p. 168
Poland in the late 1980’s.”¹ The first two regimes, sultanism and totalitarianism, are short of such conditions.² Sultanism, to follow the Weberian approach, is an extreme form of patrimonialism. “In sultanism,” Stepan argues,

the private and the public are fused, there is a strong tendency towards family power and dynastic succession, there is no distinction between a state career and personal services to the ruler; there is a lack of rationalized impersonal ideology, economic success depends on the ruler and most of all, the ruler acts only according to his own unchecked discretion, with no larger impersonal goals for the state.³

A regime close to the sultanistic ideal type is far from having a pacted transition, because two moderate players on the part of the regime and of the opposition are absent. “How can there be room in the ‘household’ staff of the sultan for a moderate player who publicly negotiates the demise of his employer?” Moreover, writes Stepan, “neither civil society nor political society has enough autonomy to enable a publicly organized democratic opposition to develop sufficient negotiating capacity for it to be a full-player in any pact-transition.”⁴ This was the case in Iran’s revolutionary transition from the Shah’s sultanistic regime in 1979.

The regime is close to an ideal typical totalitarian regime, Stepan argues, if it “has eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilization and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability for elites and non-elites alike.”⁵ Like sultanism, totalitarianism is short of “the two key players for a pacted transition,” because

no totalitarian ruler will allow ‘regime moderates’ to exist who have sufficient autonomy to conduct strategies and tactical negotiations with opposition moderates. And just as emphatically, there can be no moderate opposition players with sufficient organizational presence and followers in the polity to have enough power to negotiate their way into a transition pact. At best, therefore, an ideal-typical totalitarian regime is a two player (non) game. There is a big player (the hardliner maximum leader and his party-state-staff) and possibly an underground opposition (half a player?) that can struggle to exist and possibly resist but with absolutely no capacity to negotiate a pacted transition and, in any case, has no player to negotiate with.”⁶

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1. Ibid, pp. 170-71.
3. Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics, pp. 169-170
4. Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics, p. 170
5. Ibid, p. 169
6. Ibid
The ‘early’ post-totalitarian regime” is a post-totalitarian polity; however, it is still premature for a successful democratic transition. Given the lasting effect of totalitarian regimes, “‘early’ post-totalitarian regimes,” writes Stepan, “do not have sufficient diversity and autonomy in the ruling party-state leadership or sufficient strength and autonomy within the democratic opposition to produce all the players needed to conduct successfully a four-player transition game.”

**Four formats in four-player transition games**

The game transition might occur in the four following formats. First, if the regime hardliners and the opposition hardliners dominate the field, the result will be either repression or revolution, depending on the strength of the regime or of the opposition. The 1979 Iranian Revolution is a classic example, where the old authoritarian regime is replaced with a radical non-democratic one. Because the regime moderates and the opposition moderates were weak or absent, the old regime hardliners were replaced with the radical opposition.

Second, with no significant help from the moderate opposition or civil society and no tension among the elites on the top, the regime moderates may prove stronger than the moderate opposition and unilaterally initiate a regime democratic transition. In this case, Stepan argues, “redemocratization [is] initiated from within the authoritarian regime,” since the regime moderates realize that their long-term interests would be better served by change towards democracy. Huntington calls this “transformation.” This is the equivalent of Linz “reforma” and Linz-Stepan’s “reforma-pactada.” The cases of Spain (1976-79), Brazil (1985-88), Chile (1989), and Romania (1989) fall into this category.

Third, if the regime moderates and the opposition moderates are strong and skilful enough to convince the regime hardliners of a compromise, a peaceful democratic transition might be achieved. This process would be, to use O’Donnell and Schmitter’s phrase, a “pacted” transition, or, to use Huntington’s word, the equivalent of Linz “reforma” and Linz-Stepan’s “reforma-pactada.” The cases of Spain (1976-79), Brazil (1985-88), Chile (1989), and Romania (1989) fall into this category.

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1. According to Alfred Stepan, when an ‘early’ post-totalitarian regime such as East Germany in 1989 or a ‘frozen’ post-totalitarian regime such as Czechoslovakia from 1968 to 1989 faces a sudden crisis of opposition, these regimes are particularly vulnerable to collapse if they are not able to repress the opposition because the early or frozen post-totalitarian regime’s have a limited negotiating capability. In both cases a radically changed external context drastically altered domestic power relations. See Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*, p. 170.

2. The notion of “four-player transition game” focuses only on the internal players (hardliners and softliners of the regime and the opposition), but does not refer to the external players. In post-September 11, 2001 one could refer to the cases of external hardliners moving towards regime change. Afghanistan and Iraq are two cases where two external hardliners (Bin Laden and President George W. Bush) played a central role towards regime change.


“transplacement.” Such countries as Bolivia (1979-80), Uruguay (1982-85), and South Korea (1985-87), among others, experienced this form of transition.

Fourth, the old regime might, peacefully or violently, collapse and be replaced with democracy when moderate opposition dominates the field. Huntington calls this “replacement”, Linz “ruptura.” This occurred in Portugal (1975), Greece (1974), and Argentina (1983). Likewise, during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, regime transitions in Central and Eastern Europe from Poland to Hungary to East Germany to Czechoslovakia fell into this category. In some countries - Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic – regimes were transformed into constitutional democracies. In others – like Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania – they turned into electoral democracy. In either case, however, the political change resulted from a mishmash of reform and revolutionary elements in which the regimes were transformed through a relatively peaceful process. Timothy Garton Ash has called this a “refolution,” where dialogues and communication between the oppositional civil society and the political elites brought about peaceful regime transition. This corresponds to Charles Tilly’s argument respecting a clear distinction between revolutionary conditions and revolutionary outcomes. Although the regime transformation in Central and Eastern Europe took place under non-revolutionary conditions, Tilly viewed the outcomes as revolutionary.

Iran’s quest for democracy under Mosaddeq’s leadership (1951-53) – a short-lived democratic experience – resembles this path, since it combined a reformist path with revolutionary outcomes.

The game transition often becomes complicated when there are no “linkages between elites and masses.” In all cases the regime softliners are “liberalizers,” while the oppositional social forces belong to the camp of the “democratizers.” The former “wish to reduce the repressive features of the old system in order to enhance its performance,” while the latter wish to bring some fundamental change in the state structure. The former often discourage social movements and keep civil society forces at bay, while the latter promote social movements and mobilize civil society forces to change the status quo. The “liberalizers” in Iran’s Khatami’s reformist government (1997-2005) had realized that their long-term interests would be better served by some change, but remained both unable and unwilling to mobilize civil society forces. This

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, pp. 113-114.
2. Ibid
3. Juan J. Linz, “Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium,” p. 35
resulted in liberalization without democratization, and contributed to the failure of the reformist government.

**Third Alternative: Dialectics of Structure and Agency**

A successful democratic transition in the global South depends largely on the role of social movements and civil society forces. The third generation of democratization theories better serves this goal. This set of theories, as James Mahoney and Richard Snyder observe, represents an integrative approach in which elements of structure and human agency are synthesized. In this approach, democratization, as Ruth Berins Collier argues, is at once a class-based project and a political-strategic process in which class structure, elites, and institutions work together. Similarly, there is an attempt to make a bridge between the historical and structural “causes” and the “causers” of democracy, which correspond to the actors and agential factors. By the same token, Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan suggest that a society’s structural characteristics “constitute a series of opportunities and constraints for the social and political actors;” and yet, “those actors have certain choices that can increase or decrease the probability of the persistence and stability of a regime.” From this integrative perspective, “structures both enable and limit human agency;” they “operate as environments that delimit the range of possible actions without determining action. From this perspective, “people act through structures, rather than structures acting through people.” In other words, “actors can choose how to use structural resources and potentially improve these resources.”

Political agency, however, is very much affected by the balance of power, both among social and political forces. Democratic transition, as Tatu observes, “will take place under conditions in which power resources are so widely distributed that no [social or political] group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony.” On this view, in sum, social conditions are not the ultimate causal factor. Human choices, leadership, and political agents can make a significant difference in democratic transition.

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The affinity of social movements with democratization

According to Charles Tilly, four general processes promote democratization: they include “increases in the sheer number of people available for participation in public politics, equalization of resources and connections among those people, insulation of public policies from existing social inequalities, and integration of interpersonal trust networks into public policies.”¹ The same four factors, writes Tilly, “promote the formation of social movements” since they encourage the establishment of various forms of “associations, public meetings, demonstrations” and institutions such as political parties and labour unions.² The major question is when and how social movements promote democratization. For Tilly, this happens when “they broaden the range of participants in public politics, equalize the weight of participants in public policies, erect barriers to the direct translation of categorical inequalities into public policies, and/or increase previously segmented trust networks into public policies.”³ A successful democratic transition in the global South depends largely on the role of social movements and civil society forces. In the absence of an active and organized civil society/social movement, the softliners/reformists in the government fail to deliver the four processes of democratization. Hence, the people’s participation decreases, the public resources remain un-equalized, the existing social inequalities are not fully insulated into public policies, and the people lose their trust in the reformists. Social movements guarantee the success of a genuine democratization from below; a democracy from within.

Conclusion

Political procedural liberal democracy as introduced by Dahl and Linz offers only a limited version of democracy. It helps to the extent that it proposes a minimal base for a transition to democracy, providing us with a practical and feasible path to begin. This version of democracy is problematic as it pays little attention to socio-cultural elements of democracy. It is in this context societal empowerment and social justice remain central in the success and stability of democracy. Societal empowerment is about strengthening civil society and establishing democratic procedures based on engagement, dialogue and deliberation of civil society. Social justice gives meaning and substance to political democracy; it makes the value of democratic ideas tangible to the public. Social inequality results in a gradual decline of democratic aspirations in civil

¹ Charles Tilly, Social Movements, p. 136.
³ Charles Tilly, Social Movements, p. 143.
society; it gives rise to populist-authoritarian trends and pushes democratic ideas and institutions at bay.

In the final analysis democracy and democratization are about people, and how they come together in shaping their destiny. Democratization will not be achieved against the will of the demos; it will be accomplished with them, or not at all. For this reason the social elements of democracy – societal empowerment and social justice – remain an essential part of democracy. A deliberative model of democratic will formation can empower civil society, guarantee an equal and inclusive participation, and generate a democratic ethics of citizenship. Democratic ideas are ineffective if they are not reached by the common people. As Max Weber reminds us, ideas are powerless unless fused with material forces.\(^1\) Ideas “cannot be separated from their social settings; that is, they cannot be separated from the institutions and social groups that keep systems of ideas in the socialization process.”\(^2\) Democracy can last longer if a strong and organized civil society appreciates democratic values. Equally important is the value of social justice. Economic privatization without social justice brings about economic inequality, and resulting support for a populist agenda at the polls. Social justice brings the abstract value of democracy into the daily life of the people, and contributes to the consolidation of democracy.

A successful genuine and authentic democratization depends largely on the role of social movements and civil society forces. Democratization is at once a class-based project and a political-strategic process in which class structure, elites, and institutions work together.\(^3\) Social movements are capable of transforming structural constraints into opportunities; they change socio-political conditions. On this synthetic and dialectical view, social groups, individuals, ideas, and, to use Barrington Moore’s words, “cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history.”\(^4\) They are rooted in and influenced by social structures. However, one should not undermine the significance of social forces/social movements in the origin and success of democratization.

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